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ABSTRACT
THE NEOLIBERAL CITY AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD:
THE CASE OF THE LINDSAY HEIGHTS REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT

by

Rodney Ranken
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013
Under the Supervision of Professor Anne Bonds

A 1994 Fannie Mae report on poverty in America identified 20 census tracts in
the city of Milwaukee that had the third fastest rate of growth in poverty in the nation,
behind only areas in Detroit and Los Angeles. This prompted The Wisconsin Housing
and Economic Development Authority (WHEDA) to initiate a redevelopment program
that came to be known as Lindsay Heights. This study will ascertain what the impetus
was for the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project and analyze the role that neoliberal
governance played in its implementation. I will also examine how ideas of nostalgia and
branding of the neighborhood played a role in this process. This study will also, through
quantitative analysis, ascertain whether the project has achieved its stated goals and,
through the use of MPROP block level data, evaluate how the project has affected the
community.
The Lindsay Heights project seems to have had some measurable success in
attaining its goals. Property values went up disproportionately when compared to the city
of Milwaukee as a whole; the tax base increased; and over 160 vacant sites were filled.
By introducing new construction to neighborhoods whose existing housing stock was
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built mostly around the turn of the last century, developers virtually guaranteed that the
neighborhoods where these new homes were built would be mixed-income, due to the
drastic differences in home value between new and existing homes. In addition, the
installation of new homes in the project area has increased owner-occupancy rates and
had the effect of increasing the value of existing homes.
This study shows how the redevelopment of Milwaukee’s Lindsay Heights
neighborhood is the result of a particular form of neoliberalism that manifests itself
through slightly nuanced neoliberal processes such as quasi-public-private partnerships,
as well as specific branding of the city—and the Lindsay Heights neighborhood—that
embraces working class values and New Urbanist development philosophies. The
branding of the city as a “genuine American city” and the promotion of New Urbanist
ideology allowed city leaders to trade on Milwaukee’s working class heritage to create a
sense of place that promoted hard work and perseverance over government handouts. It is
clear that the Lindsay Heights project has been successful in achieving many of its goals
while working within the framework of traditional neoliberalism; however, it is not clear
that the project addressed the core issues, such as poverty, that caused the initial decline
of the neighborhood.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In 1994 Fannie Mae produced a report on poverty in America that identified 20
census tracts in the city of Milwaukee that had the third fastest rate of growth in poverty
in the nation, behind only areas in Detroit and Los Angeles (WHEDA 2009, Former
WHEDA staff member interview 2011). This caught the attention of The Wisconsin
Housing and Economic Development Authority (WHEDA), an organization that
facilitates the financing of affordable housing and economic development initiatives in
Wisconsin (WHEDA 2009). What alarmed WHEDA was the proximity of these
impoverished census tracts to the downtown area, which was undergoing considerable
redevelopment at the time. WHEDA was concerned with the implications this might have
for their mortgage portfolio in the Milwaukee area. One WHEDA employee compared it
to an apple with a rotten spot on it: “If you don’t do something about it, what will happen
to the rest of the apple?” (Former WHEDA staff member interview 2011). This sparked
the beginning of the Lindsay Heights redevelopment initiative, which involved the
construction of 165 houses and the renovation of 230 more over a 20 year period
beginning in 1995 and continuing through the present, although little has been done in the
study area since the housing bubble collapsed.
Begun in 1995, The Lindsay Heights redevelopment project has been hailed by
local officials as a very successful example of the ways public-private partnerships can be
instrumental in the redevelopment and redefinition of troubled inner-city neighborhoods
(Figure 1-1). Described as such, it sounds like a model of the benefits of neoliberal
policies, and in certain ways it is. However, a close examination of the larger history and
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make-up of the Lindsay Heights area suggests potentially positive and negative
influences of neoliberal policies and practices.

Figure 1-1: Location of Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project (Source: Google Maps)
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Despite the frequent reference to neoliberalism in social science literature, arguably,
an insufficient amount of attention has been paid to its influence on governance at the
scale of the neighborhood (but see Martin 2003, Elwood 2004; Ghose 2005). Given the
success claimed for it, the Lindsay Heights project offers an interesting case study to
examine in depth. Rather than focusing on residents of the neighborhood and their
participation/investment in this project, I should note that this particular evaluation
focuses on the articulation of urban problems and solutions offered by city and quasistate officials. By documenting the history of the case study area and tracing the origins,
strategies, execution, and effects of the redevelopment project, we can better understand
the role that neoliberalism and related ideologies have played in the construction of the
landscape of Milwaukee, and we can highlight the ways in which local governance
differs in shaping contemporary responses to urban problems. At the same time, we can
identify avenues that may be exploited by other cities or organizations seeking to
transform similar neighborhoods. Thus, this case study offers us theoretical insight on
and a practical evaluation of neoliberal-inspired strategies.

Public Policy and the Neighborhood: Political Economic Shifts
The urban landscape in the United States has been produced and reproduced
through various processes and policies. Perhaps the two most pervasive institutions to
shape the urban landscape in the United States are capitalism and the federal government.
There is little doubt that capitalism has played an extremely important role in the ways
urban landscapes develop and transform over time. David Harvey argues that the built
environment of the city is a manifestation of the disinvestment of capital from certain
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areas of the city, coupled with the reinvestment of capital in infrastructure in other parts
of the city, especially during periods of over-accumulation. This investment in
infrastructure leads to the reproduction of the labor force and provides avenues for future
investment in that favored area (Harvey 2010). As these investments become less
profitable they become devalued. The devalued parts of the infrastructure simply
languish.
In a broad sense, the built environment that is Lindsay Heights was an early
victim of this process. The political economy that constitutes the Keynesian approach to
capitalism varies a great deal from the neoliberal approach that is prevalent today. The
Keynesian approach viewed government as a key actor in the production of civil society.
It attempted to provide services to disadvantaged members of society through a social
safety net and other government-funded services. The neoliberal approach seeks to
drastically reduce government funding for these types of services, preferring to let
markets determine the fate of society. Neoliberalism often fails to acknowledge that the
pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps ideal of personal responsibility may be more difficult
for people from areas that have seen a disproportionate disinvestment in infrastructure
and education.
Kenneth Jackson’s study of federal housing policy from the Depression era,
highlighting the rise of the suburbs in contrast to central city neighborhoods, identifies
the impact of Keynesian policies on the uneven development of housing markets
(Jackson 1985). Historically, the United States government has been a strong proponent
of land ownership. Unfortunately, many of the policies implemented by the U.S.
government have been unfair and inequitable to minorities and the lower class. The
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National Housing Act of 1934 fundamentally changed the criteria by which home loans
were issued by providing federal insurance for long-term home loans. It was the goal of
the government to boost the housing market by allowing banks to circulate more capital
in the form of home loans. This approach was intended to make home ownership more
accessible to more people—who would then spur real estate development, thereby
creating jobs which would benefit the economy and the financial institutions who issued
the loans. Jackson argues that these policies resulted in a prejudice against older
construction, preferential treatment to upper middle class whites, and widespread
suburbanization (1985). These practices were first implemented by the Home Owners
Loan Corporation (HOLC) and later enforced by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA).
The most notorious of these practices was redlining, the process by which HOLC
employees established the location of residences whose mortgages would not be insured
by the federal government. This resulted in the concentration of poverty in older urban
areas, ethnic segregation and homogenization, and the rapid decay of inner-city
neighborhoods (Jackson, 1985).
Like many post-industrial cities, Milwaukee has had to deal with urban flight,
segregation, and a fiscal squeeze due to the loss of tax base (Schmidt 2008). For many
years Milwaukee, like other metropolitan areas, has been expanding at the periphery as
older, city neighborhoods decline. The automobile, government programs, and a shift in
planning strategies have all contributed to suburbanization across the United States
(Jackson 1985). Milwaukee, however, has also experienced a massive decline in its
manufacturing base over the last 35 years. The loss of these jobs has affected central city
residents and minorities disproportionately (Schmidt 2008). The effects of this job loss on
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central city architecture have been profound. Housing fell into disrepair. Owner-occupied
structures turned into rentals, whose condition also deteriorated. Houses were abandoned
or condemned, and eventually demolished by the city. Many structures were lost to urban
renewal and freeway construction. As these neighborhoods declined, they experienced a
cycle of disinvestment, not just in the housing stock of the neighborhood, but also in
commercial ventures and city services (Jackson 1985). In short, the deterioration of
housing and neighborhoods resulted in lower property values, decreased tax revenues,
reduced interest in investment, and an erosion of the social fabric (Kaplan et al 2005).
The challenge that has faced Milwaukee from the 1950s to the present is how to reverse
this cycle of disinvestment and revitalize inner city neighborhoods.
During the period that suburbanization and deindustrialization began to challenge
the older, working-class neighborhoods of Milwaukee, policies at the national-level also
began to shift away from Keynesian influenced urban policies. As will be explained in
the next chapter, from Nixon’s declaration that “we’re all Keynesians now” to Jimmy
Carter’s administration, the role of government began a transformation. With regard to
housing there has been a significant shift from the Keynesian approach to the marketdriven approach of neoliberalism. While much still needs to be considered regarding the
influence of neoliberal policies on housing in particular locations, there are some
generalizations that apply. Some notable differences between Keynesian and neoliberal
approaches involve the devolution of the responsibility for affordable housing from the
federal government to state and local levels, the dismantling of public housing through
Section 8 and other programs that transfer housing to the private sector, and an emphasis
on non-profit organizations’ provision of affordable housing.
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Research Questions and the Case Study
As noted earlier, neoliberal policies and practices have been studied fairly widely,
yet they have not been as widely or successfully studied at the scale of the neighborhood.
Given that one prominent feature of neoliberalism is its emphasis on localism or the idea
that each area is unique and should be allowed to forge its own policies, more small-scale
studies of neoliberal policies seem particularly important. This case study was undertaken
to establish what the impetus was for the redevelopment project was, to ascertain what
the role of neoliberal governance played in its implementation, and attempt to understand
how nostalgia and branding of the neighborhood impacted the project. Statistical analysis
will also be utilized to evaluate the impact of the project and claims of its success.
The area of Milwaukee that is known as Lindsay Heights is an excellent choice
for such study because it has seen the worst effects of many of the processes mentioned
above. It was the victim of many of the policies that resulted in the hollowing out of
central city neighborhoods. The age and condition of the housing stock and the ethnic
make-up of the neighborhood coincide rather well with Jackson’s description of the end
result of government housing policies. Historically, Lindsay Heights fits all the criteria
that would result in the FHA redlining the neighborhood. There is also little doubt that
Lindsay Heights, like much of Milwaukee, has been damaged by deindustrialization, the
loss of capital investment, and by government initiatives such as highway construction
that divided traditional communities.
Furthermore, what makes the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project worth
studying is that many claim a measure of success for it despite all of this, and despite the
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fact that it lacks the typical attractive features—proximity to waterfront or to
downtown—that have helped other urban redevelopment initiatives to succeed. The
Lindsay Heights project has also succeeded, at least by some measures, in the elusive
goal of mixed-income residents. The fact that Lindsay Heights met these goals through a
process described in neo-liberal terms provides a rare opportunity to study the narrative
underpinning neoliberal governance practices as well as the practical measures of success
for this particular neighborhood redevelopment strategy.
To effectively analyze this project, as is the case when examining local
governance in Milwaukee in general, it is necessary to untangle the several interwoven
ideas that shape/d it (see Kenny & Zimmerman 2003). The project was also significantly
influenced by the tenets of New Urbanism espoused by former Milwaukee Mayor John
Norquist, who also blamed federal policies for the decline of central city neighborhoods
and argued that a city cannot be built “on pity” (Norquist 1998). The tenets of New
Urbanism emphasize the importance of creating a strong and singular image of the urban
landscape that can compete favorably with suburbia. For these reasons, in the
redevelopment project Norquist stressed aesthetic imperatives such as the need for
continuity between new and old architecture, and the need for front porches, which
recollect a brighter past and may help connect neighbors and build a spirit of community.
In other words, the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project further provides an
interesting case study because its goals were not just financial or architectural but social.
While the social changes engendered by a redevelopment project are more difficult to
measure, the role of social ideals in the discourse surrounding the redevelopment project
provides valuable insight into the ways neoliberal policies are conceived and promoted.
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I will argue that the redevelopment of the Lindsay Heights area represents a particular
form of neoliberalism that manifests itself through neoliberal processes such as publicprivate partnerships and draws into that narrative of neo-traditional values a specific
branding of the city that embraces working class values and New Urbanist development
philosophies.
Methodology and Organization
Chapter 2 will review the literature on the theories and topics most relevant to this
study: neoliberalism, landscape, and new urbanism. Chapter 3 will utilize qualitative
analysis of documents, newspaper articles and open-ended interviews with key actors to
establish how governance and branding played a role in the project’s implementation.
The range of interview subjects include both the former and current project managers, a
member of the Department of City Development, a former assistant to Mayor Norquist
and a community organizer from the neighborhood. Chapter 3 will also present more
detailed information on the relevant history and demographics of Lindsay Heights, and
will chart the stages of the redevelopment project as it was shaped by the discourse of
neoliberalism and the values of its official sponsors. To initiate the analysis of the
project’s impact, Chapter 4 will utilize regression analysis to provide statistical data
regarding the changes in Lindsay Heights property values before and after the
redevelopment project. Chapter 5 will provide a finer-grained study of the project’s
impact by utilizing statistical analysis of three sample blocks that saw significant new
construction during the project, in comparison with a control block that did not
experience similar redevelopment. Chapter 6 will summarize the findings, discuss how
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the project exemplifies neoliberal and New Urbanist ideals and drawbacks, and offer
conclusions.
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Chapter 2: Governance and Narratives
The issues challenging the Lindsay Heights neighborhood are complex and relate
to economic change, urban policies, and values that cover decades. The context for this
pattern of development will be addressed in the next chapter. In the following, however, I
explore key concepts associated with recent expressions of governance, giving particular
attention to the discourse of neoliberalism. I will argue that local officials drew upon neotraditional values in developing the Lindsay Heights project and in evaluating its success.
For that reason, the following also addresses the symbolic role of landscape, specifically
in the form of New Urbanism, to evaluate policy and planning narratives.

Neoliberalism
To understand neoliberalism, one must go back to the classical liberalism of the
18th and 19th centuries. This liberalism can be broken down into two primary types,
American and British (Kenny 1992). Proponents of American liberalism wanted
individual freedom and a completely free market system unfettered by state regulation
(Sally, 1998). This American or Lockean style of liberalism stressed individual rights
over government power. It was felt that any power given over to government would be at
the expense of individual freedoms. Decentralization of power was preferred because it
was assumed that local government would be more responsive to the needs of its
citizenry (Kenny 1992). These concepts appealed in particular to wealthy land-owning
men who viewed these policies as an opportunity to maintain or expand their wealth.
The British style of liberalism common during this time period was often
connected to Jeremy Bentham and was more utilitarian in nature; it held that the role of
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government was to provide the greatest good for the greatest number of people by
managing society’s problems. In the twentieth century American liberalism slowly
morphed into this more utilitarian or egalitarian style of liberalism. Both styles of
liberalism viewed the free market as the obvious economic system but their view on the
role of government was somewhat different (Kenny 1992).
By the 1930s the work of John Maynard Keynes helped solidify social
movements, which eventually led to a more egalitarian liberalism. Liberal economic
failures, progressive politics, labor unions, and the success of the New Deal all helped to
strengthen egalitarian liberalism in the United States in the twentieth century (Hackworth
2007). This new Keynesian approach called for government intervention and regulation
of markets as well as the redistribution of wealth as a means of stimulating markets and
creating a social safety net. This approach was not intended to undermine the capitalist
system but to preserve it through regulation. As Jason Hackworth argues, markets are
self-destructive without state intervention and regulation, and the ebbs and flows of the
market often require intervention to generate artificial demand (Hackworth, 2007). This
redistribution has taken many forms, such as food stamps and public housing; one can
even argue that basic infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, amounts to wealth
redistribution. Indeed, investment in infrastructure was part of the spatial fix that led the
United States out of the Great Depression.
This spatial fix, along with governmental policies, enabled suburbanization and
the rise of the automobile (Harvey, 1985). It was suburbanization that, along with
deindustrialization as an aspect of the changing global economy, led to the hollowing out
of inner cities (Jackson, 1985). While suburbanization was not the direct result of
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Keynesian policies, it played a role, along with poor economic conditions, in bringing
into sharper focus the increasingly poor conditions found in many urban centers. These
conditions, along with negative unanticipated consequences of the Keynesian model, led
to the discourse of government failure that provided a platform for the neoliberal agenda.
Some scholars trace the roots of neoliberalism back to the 1970s; however, many
contend it only took firm hold with the election of Margaret Thatcher in the United
Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States (Peck and Tickell, 2007). The
tumultuous economic conditions of the 1970s led many to view Keynesian policies as a
failure. As urban metropolitan areas suburbanized and economies became less stable and
profitable, cities experienced more disinvestment. These circumstances fostered the
emergence of neoliberal rhetoric about limiting the role of government in free markets.
Neoliberal policy indicated that the only time that government should involve themselves
in the market is to ensure the continuation of free trade. This devolution of
responsibilities from federal to state and local levels is often presented as a necessary step
to restore the control of decision making to those who can respond to the needs of the
citizenry most quickly and directly and release the federal government from fiscal
responsibilities that have an adverse effect on national debt.
Geographers and other social scientists have been interested in the ways the shift
from a Keynesian to a more neoliberal ideology has affected all levels of government and
governance. The shift away from government regulation and income redistribution to a
more privatized, self-regulating system has gained a great deal of traction in recent
decades. The call for smaller government and more personal freedoms has become a
rallying cry of many conservatives. These neoliberal processes have provided systematic
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advantages to some, often at the expense of others (Peck and Tickell, 2007). It should
also be noted that neoliberalism is often discussed at the scale of the global economy and
advocacy of open markets for capital. It is not evaluated as frequently in terms of the
neoliberal city and even less frequently at the scale of the neighborhood. This is an
important consideration as the impacts of these policies are often seen in urban areas in
general and central city neighborhoods in particular (Hackworth 2007).
Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (2002), in their discussion of neoliberal
processes, refer to aspects of change described as roll-back and roll-out neoliberalism.
The roll-back neoliberalism stage refers to policies that eradicate or weaken social
welfare investments—Keynesian artifacts such as welfare and public housing
(Hackworth, 2007). The authors describe roll-out as the implementation of aggressive
neoliberal policies to secure and expand the process of neoliberalization. These policies
are often attached to specific local areas.
Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell (2002) also use the concepts of roll-out and rollback to explain the processes behind neoliberalism. The authors go on to suggest, with
the help of David Harvey, that much of what they refer to as “local neoliberalisms”
constitutes a “race to the bottom” for many localities “in which competition seems to
operate not as a beneficial hidden hand, but as an external coercive law forcing the lowest
common denominator of social responsibility and welfare provision within a
competitively organized urban system” (pg. 393). Peck and Tickell work on the
assumption of scale that pits one city against another, but these same competitions can
take place within the scale of a single city.
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Public-private partnerships, in which public monies are used to leverage private
investment, support job and market development within a particular jurisdiction, thus
providing government with a role for facilitating private sector development. There are
many ways that cities have attempted to arrest capital and become more entrepreneurial.
In the case of Milwaukee the government used culture as an economic development tool.
Their approach was to utilize Milwaukee’s reputation as a hardworking town with solid
mid-western values to compete with other localities to lure businesses back to the city
(Kenny 1995).
This shift in roles for local government to entrepreneurialism replaces a
managerial one that also redefines relationships at the grass-roots level of the community.
In many cases public-private partnerships rely on citizen participation to promote and
legitimize this new form of governance. Sarah Elwood (2004) discusses how the “new
localism” may provide opportunities for more citizen participation; however, these
opportunities can come at a price. Neoliberalism has necessitated the involvement of
local citizens in order to maintain the level of services that used to be provided by
government programs. Practices that empower local citizens often have the effect of
leaving communities with fewer opportunities because they are forced to compete for
dwindling state or other resources. These resources also tend to be earmarked for specific
purposes. Housing and renovation of housing stock often receive a great deal of attention.
This attention is supposed to lead to reinvestment in the neighborhood as a whole;
however, community organizations have admitted that housing has been put at the
forefront at the expense of other critical neighborhood issues (Ghose 2005).
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It is somewhat ironic that the shift away from a Keynesian approach toward a
neoliberal scheme, which calls for less government involvement and more free market
influence, often requires a considerable amount of government involvement for its
implementation and continuation. Geographers have written extensively about
neoliberalism and its consequences. These critiques have taken many forms. Often these
critiques analyze neoliberal policies and their impact on governance, development,
economics and democracy. Much of the neoliberal literature incorporates concepts of
scale in their critiques. While the effects of neoliberal policies have been dissected at the
local, regional, and global scales, arguably the neoliberal city requires greater attention as
a focus of study rather than as an explanatory variable. While this is important work,
perhaps the focus on scale has come at the expense of other geographical considerations
such as landscape.
As neoliberal policies become more prevalent in our society it is important to
consider their impact on all aspects of society, including our physical and cultural
landscapes. We must examine the positive and negative effects of these policies and
determine whether it is possible to implement planning policies that would promote
equality while working within the constructs of the contemporary, pervasive neoliberal
agenda.

The Neoliberal City
In his 1978 essay, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The
Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism,” Harvey argues that the
processes of capital restructuring force cities and other urban centers into competition
with each other. This drive to arrest mobile capital has resulted in a new form of
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governance (Harvey 2010). This new form of urban governance is characterized by the
public/private partnership. Harvey points out that these partnerships are often subsidized
by the public sphere and require little risk on the part of the private sector and, often,
these partnerships take place at the local scale (2008).
Many authors have pointed out that one factor that has allowed for neoliberalism
to become so pervasive is that it is a process and not an end state (Peck and Tickell 2002,
Wilson 2004, Hackworth 2007). This process is geographically situated, so it takes on
different forms depending on where the process occurs. It can include the removal of
government programs or the implementation of public-private partnerships. In the case of
Lindsay Heights, the processes were often linked to policies or local branding that were
taking place at the time of the project.

Neoliberal Landscapes
Even before the adoption of neoliberal policies in the 1970s and 1980s, there
existed a fundamental dance between developers and planners. The former were
concerned with profits and profitability, while the latter, ideally, were concerned with
public interests. As neoliberalism has gradually taken hold, it has removed power from
the planners and given it over to developers and corporate interests. This is perhaps best
exemplified by downtown development priorities along with the further expansion of
suburbia. These bastions of conspicuous consumption are so prevalent that they have
become a socially accepted norm, even a goal. However, as with any landscape, there is a
flip-side, which is often the disenfranchised older, city neighborhoods. The standard
neoliberal discourse of public failure often serves to solidify and exacerbate many of the
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social issues experienced by city residents by driving investment and economic activity
out.
New Urbanism, to be discussed later, may offer an approach that works within the
framework of neoliberal policies and approaches, while still producing a more equitable
and sustainable landscape within older urban areas. Examples in Milwaukee include the
Third Ward and the River Walk. While the Third Ward does not exemplify affordable
housing, it does represent a high profile and successful mixed-use redevelopment strategy
that shows that New Urbanism does not always equal new suburbanism.

Landscape
The word landscape, as envisioned by most people, generally takes on a physical
form. However, landscapes are not simply the physical features but they also contain
meaning that reflects the way they were created, represented and interpreted (Morin,
2009). Landscapes, as an analytical tool, is significant when considered in terms of
symbolic meaning, that is – as an expression of social, cultural, political and economic
values for a particular reference group. If one considers landscapes to be a social
construct then it is important to consider who exactly is constructing them.
Denis Cosgrove has pointed out that the historical way of seeing landscape is
important because it allows individuals to view landscape as property or commodity
(1985). The commodification of landscape has become a universally accepted social
practice. Ownership becomes paramount. It provides a mechanism to produce and
reproduce landscapes. Ownership not only provides the owner with the ability to control
the physical landscape, but it also allows for control over how the landscape is
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represented and interpreted (Mitchell, 2003). Thus, the symbolic content of a landscape
type gains hegemonic force, naturalizing social relations in a ‘taken-for-granted’ manner.
To further develop the significance of landscape, it is acknowledged that humans
have the power to control, shape, and reshape the landscape, resulting in what Schein
calls a “discourse materialized” (1997). Landscapes can be seen as a collection of
physical objects arranged in a particular way that lends meaning to the objects
individually and as a whole. But because these meanings are the result of individual or
group interpretations of the objects, a landscape can have multiple meanings, and these
meanings can be under constant revision (Morin, 2009). For example, a grand plantation
house might hold very different meanings for Southern whites and for blacks, or for
Americans in 1860 and in 1960. The result of this constant revision is a landscape that is
unique both physically and discursively. Landscapes complicate attempts at
generalization.
Approaches to understanding landscape differ, but there are several areas of
commonality. While most landscapes have a physical component, it is the symbolic
significance of landscape that plays a critical role in our understanding and interpretation.
Those who wield power, be it social, cultural, economic, or gendered, are best positioned
to create, represent, and interpret landscapes. Cultural norms and socially acceptable
practices provide this important framework for conceptualizing landscape.

Symbolic Landscape of Urban Neighborhoods
While Keynesian policies attempted to resolve market problems to meet the
‘public good’ they did display many deficiencies. In terms of resolving problems of the
real estate market, there was a clear anti-urban bias that allowed for the expansion of the
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suburbs while many urban areas experienced economic decline. This trend continued as
neoliberalism took hold. Market forces saw little profit in urban redevelopment that did
not meet certain criteria, such as direct proximity to downtown and/or waterfront areas. It
should be pointed out that Milwaukee’s Mayor Norquist, in his embrace of New
Urbanism, was very anti-suburb and saw Milwaukee’s older neighborhoods and
commercial areas as offering desirable alternatives to the “characterless” qualities of tract
housing and strip development. His famous slide show, contrasting superior urban
qualities with decidedly negative suburban development, provided a visual argument
extolling the qualities of a pre-WWII city landscape. In doing this, his promotion of the
city was not unlike that of previous mayors who attempted to slow if not reverse the flow
of middle-class residents on their way to suburbia. What distinguished Norquist’s
approach, however, was his ability to tap into a contemporary movement that applauded
the character of older urban development – New Urbanism.

New Urbanism
The New Urbanism movement, which evolved in the 1990s and was codified in
Michael Leccese and Kathleen McCormick’s 2002 publication, Charter of the New
Urbanism, seeks to combat many hallmarks of twentieth century urban development:
architectural anomalies, urban sprawl, segregation by race and income, loss of
agricultural and green space beyond city limits, and the degradation of inner city
communities. New Urbanists promote the restoration of existing urban neighborhoods
while respecting historic neighborhood boundaries and architectural traditions. They
favor mixed-use and diverse neighborhoods that promote pedestrian and mass transit
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usage, and they urge planners to keep in mind the ways they construct not just buildings
but communities.
New Urbanist discourse also strongly promotes a sense of place. Former Mayor
John Norquist was a founder and is now president of the Congress for New Urbanism, so
it is not surprising that the city of Milwaukee has promoted the charter of New Urbanism
(Voigt et al, 2006). A complex and ambitious approach, New Urbanism focuses on many
aspects of architecture and the built environment, as well as on “making community”
(Williams 2008). It asks architects, planners, local governments, and individuals to
rethink, on several scales, the ways that people live and work in their “building, block,
street, neighborhood, district, corridor, and region” (Moule 2002, 21). One way to
understand New Urbanism is to think about older urbanism, and in particular, the walking
city.
The charter of New Urbanism promotes a return to mixed use communities that is
more consistent with the walking city that was common before the transportation
revolution. New Urbanists advocate design and planning that enable people to live, work,
shop, and attend school in or near the neighborhoods where they live. New Urbanists
have refined the concepts of spatial organization of Ebenezer Howard and Patrick
Geddes, among others, and attempted to apply them to the modern city (Robbins 2004).
The promotion of New Urbanism ideals often relies on a distinctive sense of place
as well as nostalgia for a bygone era. These values can appeal to the residents or
prospective residents of a given community (Kenny and Zimmerman, 2003). People who
return to the city from suburbia are even sometimes referred to as “adventurers” who
have chosen to conquer this rough landscape (Kenny and Zimmerman, 2003).
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Supporters of New Urbanism, such as John Norquist, offer up New Urbanist ideas
as a cure for the ills of the city. It is an egalitarian vision that arrests sprawl, promotes
community and strengthens the heart of American cities so that they may return to their
former glory. However, New Urbanism does have its detractors. Anyone who has studied
urban landscapes understands the difference between promoting mixed-use and mixedincome communities and seeing them become a reality. Intense segregation and other
socio-economic factors conspire to make these goals very difficult to achieve in many
communities.
There are also critiques of the goals themselves. Due to the scale, location, and
normative vision of some of the more famous planned New Urbanist communities, such
as Celebration, Florida, some critics have taken to referring to the concept as new
suburbanism. While Norquist's agenda in Milwaukee defies that characterization, it does
draw upon similar neo-traditional values that some describe as naïve in their assumed
link between the built-environment and community. Moreover, what this discourse of
place and nostalgia often fails to consider are the class and race issues connected to the
actual past (Kenny, 1995). It is easy for those who have not been the victims of racism to
hearken back to a nostalgic past with longing. Non-whites who have lived through that
same past undoubtedly recall it differently.
In chapter three I will discuss how New Urbanism manifested itself in Milwaukee
as well as Mayor Norquist’s influence on the changing landscape of neighborhoods in
Milwaukee.
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Chapter 3: The Changing Landscape of Lindsay Heights

“Lindsay Heights steps into a new era”
With this November 2008 headline, a Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reporter
announced a significant award to the Lindsay Heights neighborhood from the local Zilber
foundation (Pabst 2008). Philanthropist Joe Zilber chose the Lindsay Heights
neighborhood organization (Walnut Way Conservation Corp) to administer an $875,000
redevelopment grant over a four year period with an additional $250,000 “seed grant” to
start a food co-op and commercial development. Although the neighborhood group’s
success in grass-roots efforts was given credit for this choice, according to the newspaper
account, WHEDA’s Lindsay Heights project initially brought attention to the
neighborhood. Quoting WHEDA’s manager of community development, the newspaper’s
narrative established the key elements of success, indicating:
The area needed a lot of assistance and investment. Because of the available land,
WHEDA, the city, banks and others launched a pilot project to jump-start housing
development. [...] The WHEDA project built 165 new houses in the
neighborhood, and 221 more have been rehabilitated. While WHEDA has made
other mortgages, housing development in the area is now market-driven (Pabst
2008).
This progress report, written five years ago and before the collapse of the real estate
market, gives WHEDA’s project credit for providing the necessary assistance to attract
private sector housing development. The news story did not question whether real estate
development would provide the appropriate assistance for a poor neighborhood. Success
was measured by construction activity and the possibility that the neighbors would regain
a quality of life associated with an earlier era. That the necessary assistance came from
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two different nonprofits, that is WHEDA and the Zilber Foundation, draws further on the
discourse of neoliberalism.
This chapter provides a qualitative evaluation of the Lindsay Heights
Redevelopment Project by examining the parts to the success story, as described in this
news story and by the ongoing commentary of local leaders (Interviews A, B and C). To
situate the neighborhood in terms of its original and evolving character, the first part of
the chapter will focus on descriptive statistics of the study area. In the second part of the
chapter, I will analyze the leadership of Mayor Norquist given his influence on
redevelopment in the city. This textual analysis contributes to an understanding of the
links between the discourses of neoliberalism and planning priorities. Within that context,
I will then discuss how quasi-state agencies such as WHEDA have played a role by
providing resources to the project. Finally, I will discuss the landscape based on texts of
New Urbanism further noting its links to neoliberalism via ‘neo-traditional’ values and
consider the architectural continuity of the new homes in Lindsay Heights.

Shifting Demographics and Neighborhood Change
Historical Background
Encompassing approximately 110 city blocks, the Lindsay Heights area is
currently home to approximately 7000 residents (Figure 3-1). Located about two miles
northwest of downtown Milwaukee, the neighborhood is bordered by Locust Street to the
north, Walnut Street to the south, 12th Street to the east, and 20th Street to the west.
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Figure 3-1: Lindsay Heights, City Homes and Proposed Park West Freeway (source: Author)
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The area was named for Bernice Lindsay, a human rights activist who was an
advocate for Milwaukee’s African-American communities throughout much of the
twentieth century. She served as executive secretary of the North side YWCA from 1928
to 1949, and was an original member of the Milwaukee Commission on Human Rights.
In 1963 she founded Milwaukee’s Creative Center. However, among older members of
Milwaukee’s African American community, she is best known for her pioneering activity
in moving beyond the bounds of the early twentieth-century ghetto. In the immediate
post-WWII years, when the residential boundaries of Milwaukee’s Black community
were one-mile square and ended with its northern boundary of Walnut Street, Mrs.
Lindsay purchased a house well beyond that on N. Humboldt (Trotter 1985; Interview C).
Thus, in terms of the history of Black Milwaukee, the study area represents a period of
growth for the community and movement beyond its older ghetto boundaries. By naming
the project for Mrs. Lindsay, her activism and commitment to improved housing is
honored.
According to Charles T. O’Reilly et al, the area was mainly developed in the late
1800s and early 1900s, with over 90% of the surviving housing stock built between 1880
and 1920 (O’Reilly et al 1965). A predominantly working class neighborhood during its
construction, Lindsay Heights began to experience change in the years immediately after
WWII (O’Reilly et al 1965). Described as a “second generation” city due to the later
impact of the Great Migration, Milwaukee’s African American population grew during
the war years but its significant growth began in the 1950s and extended into the 1960s
(Rose 1972). Thus, the expansion of African American neighborhoods matched post-war
suburbanization. White flight and FHA loan guidelines, as well as other factors, gradually
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transformed the area from a mostly white working class neighborhood to a more racially
mixed and, in time, impoverished neighborhood.

Demographic Information
The census tracts that most closely approximate the land area known as Lindsay
Heights between 1940 and 2000 consist of six tracts. From 1940 through 1960 their
numbers were 27, 28, 37, 38, 50, and 51; these were bordered by Locust St. to the north,
Galena St. to the south, 12th St. to the east and 20th St. to the west (Appendix A; Figure
A-1). In 1970 the tract numbers were changed to 118, 117, 102, 101, 86 and 85 but the
tracts’ borders remained the same (Appendix A; Figure A-2).
The census tract information for the Lindsay Heights area illustrates the severe
social and economic stress that the community has had to endure since World War II
(Table 3-1). In 1940 the area now known as Lindsay Heights represented 3.8% of
Milwaukee’s overall population; by 2000 it fell to 1.1%. Perhaps this should not come as
a surprise considering total housing stock fell from 6283 units in 1940 to 2302 by 2000.
Beginning in 1950, when census information first became available at the census tract
level, median income in Lindsay Heights was almost identical to the city wide average
and by 1960 it was only $525 less than that of Milwaukee as a whole. However, by 1970
median income had dropped to almost half that of the city wide average. Median income
continued to fall relative to the city average until by 2000 it was 31% of the city average.
Graduation rates were consistently lower than the city average and those living below
poverty were often four to five times higher than the city of Milwaukee. Perhaps the only
positive statistic relates to home values. While consistently less than the city average,

Table 3-1: 1940-2000 Consolidated Census Tract Data for Lindsay Heights and Milwaukee

Census Tracts*
Population
Total
White
Black
White Foreign
Born
Other

L.H.

MKE

1940

1940

22,212
17257
1

587,492

L.H.
1950

MKE

L.H.

MKE

L.H.

MKE

L.H.

1950

1960

1960

1970

1970

1980

741,324

14,694
860
13757

717,372

10,058

21,287
17907
227

637,392 20,637
6533

4951
3

3126
27

196

Median Income
% High School+
Graduates
% Below
Poverty Line
Housing:

N/A

$3,306

$3,340 $5,169

Total Stock
Owner-Occupied
Black
White
Rental
Black
White

6283
1719

Vacant Lots
Median Home
Value

77

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

4387

126
$3,223

$4,084

9710

$5,694

10%

MKE
1980
636,212
453,970
145,850

348

1990

1990

2000

2000

8639
8448

628,088
381,717
189,408

6354
163
5944

596,974
270,989
220,432

106

$8,391

$16,028

$11,079

$32,359

$4,984

$16,028

24%

49%

36%

64%

43%

79%

30%

64%

33%

8%

37%

11%

55%

12%

39%

11%

2522
672

254,204

2302
608
N/A
N/A
2174
N/A
N/A

249,225
105,235

13,664

331

17,037

$76,600

$40,167

$45,500

3476
870
807
63
2174
2115
59

253,445

94

407

452

401

11,628

$15,283

$45,500

$15,100

MKE

$10,262

4533
1104
888
211
3047
2865
185

$9,033

L.H.

$5,899

5926
1779
777
1002
3817
2589
1228

$11,086

MKE

191

6446
2231
27
2204
4178
28
4150

$7,285

L.H.

$7,750

$18,200

1850

$22,467

* Lindsay Heights (LH) figures are compiled/consolidated from the 6 census tracts that comprise the area that became Lindsay Heights. Figures for LH Median
Home Value and Median Income represent averages of the mean values from each of the 6 census tracts. See Appendix A for complete data broken down by the
6 census tracts.
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median home value in Lindsay Heights showed a dramatic rebound between 1990, when
median home value was $22,467, and 2000 when it reached $40,167. Coupled with a
drastic drop in home values in Milwaukee as a whole this brought Lindsay Heights to
within $5,333 of the city average (Table 3-1).
In 1940 these census tracts in Milwaukee were overwhelmingly white, with only
one of the 22,212 residents listed as black and only three listed as other. Of the 6,283
homes, 4,387 were rentals, with an average home value across all six tracts of $3,223.
There were 126 lots vacant (Table 3-1; Appendix A: Table A-1 for detailed analysis).
By 1950 these census tracts begin to show a shift in demographics. The number
of black residents increased to 227. The overwhelming majority of these new black
residents were located in census tracts 28 and 37, which are the southern and eastern most
of the six tracks. Median income in the area averaged $3,306, which was just $35 or 1%
less than the city of Milwaukee as a whole. Approximately two-thirds of the housing
stock remained rentals, and the average value of the homes in the six census tracts
increased by $4,000 (Appendix A: Table A-2).
The 1960 census data showed a dramatic shift in population demographics, but
total population remained fairly constant. Black residents constituted two-thirds of the
overall population. The average of median income for the six census tracts was $5,169,
compared to $5,694 for the city of Milwaukee. Perhaps the most notable statistic is the
drop in total housing stock, with the six census tracts losing over 400 homes (Appendix
A: Table A-3).
This loss was further exaggerated during the 1960s with the clearance of over
1500 houses for the planned construction of the Park West Freeway (Wisconsin
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Highways). This failed project cut a broad swath through the study area and increased
uncertainty regarding the area’s future (Figure 3-1). By 1970 over ninety percent of the
residents in these census tracts were black. The average of median incomes had only
increased by $800 over the past 10 years, which was a little more than half of the city of
Milwaukee’s average of $10,262. Over 30% of residents were living below the poverty
line, compared to 8.1% in the city as a whole. Total housing stock in the census tracts
dropped by nearly 1,400 units since 1960, and median home value went down in all but
one census tract (Appendix A: Table A-4).
1980 showed a decline of over 4,600 residents since 1970, as well as a loss of over
1,000 housing units. The percentage of high school graduates in the six census tracts was
approximately half that of the city as a whole, and the percentage of people living below
the poverty line was still three times as great as the average for the city of Milwaukee.
The only positive indicator in the census data for the period from 1970 to 1980 was that
median home values in the area doubled. However with an average of the medians of
$15,283 for the six census tracts, housing stock was still just one-third of the city average
of $45,500 (Appendix A: Table A-5).
By 1990 the area had lost an additional 1,400 residents and over 940 housing
units. Median income remained about one-third of the city average and over half the
families living in these census tracts were living below the poverty line. While home
values increased they still remained less than a third of the city average (Appendix A:
Table A-6).
The 2000 census showed a continued drop in population and housing stock in
spite of the redevelopment project having been under way for five years. In addition
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median income fell by half and the percentage of high school graduates dropped by 12%.
The number of renters increased while the number of owner-occupied homes fell. The
only positive statistics, when compared to 1990 is a 16% drop in those living below the
poverty line and a substantial increase in median home value. However median home
values were still less than half of Milwaukee as a whole (Appendix A: Table A-7).
Unfortunately, the census tracts covering this area changed radically in 2010,
dividing the area up into several different neighboring census tracts. This makes it
impossible to present comparable data from 2010. However, according to the Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel article referred to at the beginning of this chapter, available statistics
indicated that 48% of area residents live below the poverty line, 25% are unemployed,
45% do not have a high school diploma and less than 5% have a college degree (Pabst
2008). While the headline claimed that Lindsay Heights had stepped into a new era, the
number of people living below the poverty line had increased. The significant part of the
story, as indicated by a WHEDA staff person, was the market activity in housing
development: “We believe this has been very successful because we have shown that new
home construction could be built in the central city” (Pabst 2008).

Governance and the Discourse of Neoliberalism
As stated earlier, neoliberalism has had a profound effect on governance at the
local level. The reduction in availability of federal funds to cities has forced them to
resort to a form of governance that relies on nonprofits, public/private partnerships,
quasi-state organizations and the leveraging of funds to maintain basic services or
promote growth. In many cases public-private partnerships rely on citizen participation to
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promote and legitimize this new form of governance. While this may provide
opportunities for citizens in a given community these opportunities require citizens in
certain communities to put forth much more effort to maintain services that other
communities take for granted. Often the practices that empower local citizens also leave
communities with fewer opportunities because they are forced to compete for dwindling
state or other resources. These resources also tend to be earmarked for housing and
renovation of housing stock. This is supposed to lead to reinvestment in the neighborhood
as a whole; however, community organizations have admitted that housing has been
focused on at the expense of other critical neighborhood issues (Ghose 2005). This focus
on housing can be the result of many different factors but one factor that often plays an
important role is local leadership.
Milwaukee’s Leadership
To understand the role that leadership played in the Lindsay Heights
redevelopment project it is important to understand the goals and aspirations of the city’s
Mayor John Norquist, who was in office for fifteen years (1988-2003) and presided over
the rollout process that set the context for the Lindsay Heights redevelopment project.
In his book, The Wealth of Cities, Norquist argues that “you can’t build the city
on pity” (1998). He claims that the process by which cities seek federal funds for
development or other programs is unsustainable. His assertion is that if cities continue to
ask for federal subsidies because they have been the victims of economic hardships, the
pity that generated the initial offering will turn to contempt (Norquist, 1998). Norquist
goes on to state that “No one, particularly no one with money—whether the federal
government or private investors—likes to be around a loser” (1998). This clearly reflects
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the neoliberal rhetoric regarding the changing roles of public investment in social
welfare. He considers the city a product of market influences and contends that cities
would exist even if their governments were removed, because cities, by the nature of their
locations, are where people come together to trade (1998). Norquist drew upon cultural
capital to brand his city in the competition to attract capital.
In his book, Norquist also proposes cutting government spending, reducing
welfare programs, lowering taxes, increasing the police force, revamping the public
school system through vouchers and reducing or eliminating public housing (1998). It is
his opinion that if cities can accomplish these goals they can position themselves to be
competitive in the market. These are some examples of rollback and rollout processes.
Many of the goals set forth by Norquist fall perfectly in line with neoliberal ideology that
promotes less government, lower taxes and more personal responsibility.
Norquist dedicates an entire chapter of his book to an explanation of how New
Urbanism can solve many of the development issues facing cities today. Norquist is no
fan of suburbia and considers suburban regions to be in competition for capital just like
other cities. It is this narrative of competition that leads Norquist and Milwaukee to
embrace place and New Urbanism as tactics to compete in a neoliberal world. The
relationship between New Urbanism, neoliberalism and the new construction in the
Lindsay Heights project is taken up later in the chapter.
Within the narrative of competition, place can be very important. Milwaukee, like
many other cities, has attempted to cash in on its cultural capital (Kenny, 1995). These
cultural resources have been used to try to attract investment by promoting a particular
lifestyle or tradition. Milwaukee has a history and culture that differentiates it from

34

suburbia and other localities. Of course this type of city branding is nothing new.
Milwaukee has been trying to attract investment through self-promotion for over one
hundred years (Kenny and Zimmerman, 2003). To make a distinction between the
mayor’s role as city booster and the work of previous mayors, a contrast between his
predecessor, Mayor Henry Maier (1960 – 1980), and his agenda is illustrative. Mayor
Maier’s attempt to maintain Milwaukee’s population and tax base involved efforts to
slow suburbanization by appealing to his working and middle-class, white ethnic base
(Gurda 1999). Norquist emphasized the growth of Milwaukee’s downtown, the attraction
of a creative class clientele, and the return of middle-class homeowners to the city
(Kenny & Zimmerman 2003).
What has changed is the type of branding or image the city tries to cultivate. It has
gone from a city that celebrates its industrial strength to one that tries to recapture the
essence of that lost strength. Ironically, the promotion of working class values and the
branding of Milwaukee as a genuine American city have attempted to arrest capital that
rarely benefits the working class (Kenny, 1995, Kenny and Zimmerman, 2003). In fact,
Norquist primary focus in the first years of his administration was on the development of
Milwaukee’s Downtown. Complaints from neighborhood leaders about the lack of
attention to the poorer areas of the city finally brought a response in 1995 when
construction began on the City Homes subdivision. The subdivision is located on the
southwest corner of Lindsay Heights (Figure 3-1) at the corner of 20th street and W.
Walnut St .The Redevelopment Authority of the City of Milwaukee used eminent domain
to purchase existing homes in the area in an effort to create this new subdivision (Herguth
2009).
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WHEDA and the Origins of the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Plan
WHEDA personnel cite a more indirect influence on the development of the
Lindsay Heights project (Interview A 2011). The initial push by the Wisconsin Housing
and Economic Development Authority (WHEDA) came in response to Fannie Mae’s
alarming “Report on Poverty in America,” which showed that over 40% of residents in
the Lindsay Heights area were living in extreme poverty. WHEDA developed the
Milwaukee Urban Commitment in 1995 (WHEDA 2009). They pledged $100 million to
be used in a five-year investment plan for their newly formed Urban Initiative Area
(UIA) (Derus, 2000). This money was earmarked to underwrite low-interest loans and
back other commercial ventures in the area. At the inception of the project, WHEDA’s
primary goal was to help first-time low- to middle-income families secure mortgages.
This public-private partnership required local banks to make the loan but held WHEDA
responsible in case of default.
In the dynamics of public-private partnerships, WHEDA appears difficult to
categorize at first glance. It is, in a sense, a quasi-government organization akin to local
development commissions that have a public role associated with development charges
but maintain separation in order to exercise independence in program implementation and
resource allocation. The organization was established by the state in 1972 under the
original name, the Wisconsin Housing Authority. WHEDA’s director and six members of
its twelve-person Board of Directors are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the
state legislature. The rest of the board of directors is comprised of two state senators (one
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from each party), two state representatives (one from each party), and the secretaries of
the Wisconsin Departments of Administration and Commerce (WHEDA 2009).
Despite this, WHEDA defines itself as “an independent authority, not a state
agency” (WHEDA 2009). WHEDA programs are not funded by taxes but by “the sale of
revenue bonds [which] allow us to fund financing programs that help stimulate affordable
housing and economic development throughout the state” (WHEDA 2009). From its
origins, WHEDA focused on housing for low and middle income families, the elderly,
and the disabled, attempting to use housing as an economic redevelopment tool. The
organization initially received $250,000 in seed money from the state of Wisconsin, and
was empowered to make construction, rehab, and mortgage loans for the development of
low and moderate income housing projects. In 1973 they received a favorable decision
from the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the constitutionality of their authority, and went
on to issue over $27 million in housing revenue bonds and making loans through the
Section 8 Multifamily Loan Program and the Veterans Single Family Home Loan
Program. In 1979 they repaid their original seed money from the state of Wisconsin. In
1983 they changed their name from the Wisconsin Housing Authority to WHEDA. In
2009, WHEDA claimed over $3 billion in assets (WHEDA 2009).
WHEDA’s position in between the public and private spheres makes it difficult to
plug it into the public-private equation when analyzing its relationship to neoliberal
policies. At the same time, perhaps its hybrid public-private nature makes WHEDA a
fundamentally neoliberal construction.
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Initial Stages of the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project
Near the outset, WHEDA appointed a staff member to oversee the initiative,
which began in relatively modest terms. At first, WHEDA’s rather small staff worked
with city officials to clear trash and abandoned vehicles from the area and to step up
efforts to reduce crime. Milwaukee Police provided Area Saturation Patrol (ASP) units
that allowed residents to report with relative anonymity on local criminal activity
(WHEDA 2009, Interview A 2011). The Department of Neighborhood Services increased
efforts to address vacant and boarded-up buildings and to demolish condemned buildings
(WHEDA 2009).
Between 1995 and 1997, WHEDA also sought out local non-profit organizations
with whom they could partner and settled on the YMCA Community Development
Corporation. In meetings with community members at the north side YMCA and
elsewhere, the staff member solicited input from local residents about their concerns and
desires for their neighborhood. This practice falls in line with neoliberal forms of
governance that call for increased decision making at increasingly smaller scales (Martin,
2003). WHEDA officials made an effort to establish what these residents were hoping to
accomplish, and designed a set of goals to revitalize the neighborhood without adversely
affecting its current residents (Rathman 2002).
The staff member’s long description of the stages of the redevelopment initiative
demonstrate his/her commitment to helping residents achieve their aims, but it also
provides important insight into the ways in which small numbers of unelected but
dedicated individuals can influence the course of public-private partnerships and thus
have a profound impact on public and private resources and interests.
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My view of leadership was different from an awful lot of other people’s. I believe
[…] if you want to help [an area] to change, you have to know what the people
who live and do business in that area think. Not necessarily the elected officials.
Not necessarily the pastors of big churches. Not necessarily the businessmen with
the most money in the area. You really need to work with people who live there.
And you need to help them achieve what they want to achieve for their own
neighborhood. So in that regard, I went to all kinds of […] community meetings,
church meetings, and volunteer group meetings. And I’d go in and sit in the back
and watch for the person that everybody walked by to speak to. Or sat down and
visited with. Because I figured, OK, that’s a person whose opinion counts. That’s
somebody everybody else respects. [… T]hat’s the person that I want to talk to.
(Emphasis added, Interview A 2011).
While the staff member describes consulting a wide variety of ordinary citizens to
determine the desires of local residents, the staff member also implies, in his/her opening
words, that others in his/her role do not necessarily do this. One obvious drawback of
using private agencies to address public concerns is the fact that unelected actors may not
feel the same responsibility and incentive to honor the wishes of constituents that elected
officials, at least theoretically, might feel. The very idea that one non-elected individual
working for a quasi-governmental agency can exert such influence over a community to
which he/she has no other attachment also speaks broadly to the type of neoliberal
policies that allow the few with power to shape the fate of other citizens.
The staff member concluded that what the residents desired was a return to the
neighborhood that they remembered. Many residents were worried that they would lose
their homes to the city through eminent domain, as had happened in the 1950’s and 60’s
due to freeway construction, or more recently in the nearby City Homes Subdivision
development (WHEDA 2009). Residents did not want to see their neighborhood replaced
by large public housing projects, and they wanted to see more homes owner-occupied and
well maintained (WHEDA 2009; Interview A 2011).

39

In the summer of 1995 WHEDA, working with the YMCA, provided a budget of
$50,000 for a “Paint and Fix-Up Program” (WHEDA 2009). Local residents would be
reimbursed up to $500 for external repair projects that they completed on their homes.
The plan was meant to improve facades, foster neighborhood pride, and encourage
residents to help themselves. To encourage participation, WHEDA simplified the process
of reimbursement and did not require residents to show permits, hire licensed contractors,
or submit their work to building inspectors. The staff member explains how some
residents were reluctant, nonetheless, to participate:
It took us a while to get people to use that program […] People had had some bad
experiences. For instance, if they’d worked with the city to use any of the city’s
grant money, there were so many strings attached to it. Like, OK, you’re gonna
have a grant to fix this, but that means an inspector’s gonna come in your house
and there’s gonna be all these other things that you also have to fix, you have to
bring everything up to code. And so they were afraid that […] we’d be sending
inspectors and that kind of stuff. And we said, no. Understand that this is for you
to fix what you want to fix. Now, we recommend that you fix it to code, because
you’re gonna be the one in trouble if ever that comes up. But we’re no codeenforcers. We’re just providing the grant to do this. Well, what color paint can I
get? Any color paint you want. Well, people hadn’t had choices before. [… N]ot
only did people feel that they had no power to change conditions in their
neighborhood, but they had no choices either. So, with this tiny little program we
were offering choices. And we were offering people an opportunity to help
themselves. We weren’t gonna do it for them (Interview A 2011).
Several tropes of neoliberal ideology shine through the staff member’s narrative.
Government is characterized as an intruder, and regulation is viewed as a nuisance or a
threat that impedes progress and limits individual choice, rendering residents powerless
to change their living conditions. This representation posits government as a caretaker of
people who do not or cannot take care of themselves. In contrast, quite literally,
WHEDA’s 2009 executive report on the redevelopment project lists one of their goals as
follows: “Promote self-help among residents rather than waiting for federal grant dollars
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to fix all physical housing problems at once” (WHEDA 2009). The tenor of these
comments suggests certain condescension toward the local residents, whose wishes
WHEDA professed to honor.
Certainly aesthetic improvements can play an important role in (re)generating
residents’ enthusiasm for their homes and neighborhood. They can also begin to change
outsiders’ perceptions of the area, or change the neighborhood’s brand, which can affect
property values. But improvements to a façade can of course mask more serious and even
hazardous problems in a home’s construction. If a home has a broken staircase, mold, or
a radon problem, spending $500 on new exterior paint might not be the best use of scarce
resources. The staff member’s ambivalence about building codes can be interpreted as a
preference for beauty over safety. Nevertheless, WHEDA’s decision to allot resources to
elements that shape perception seemed to help build momentum and belief in the
possibility of real positive change in the neighborhood; it also helped WHEDA gain the
trust and cooperation of local residents. This would be essential for later stages of the
redevelopment project.
By most accounts, this initial Paint and Fix-Up initiative was a great success, and
many residents, spurred on by the initiative, spent much more than the reimbursed $500
to make further home improvements (WHEDA 2009). However, the staff member
reported initial disappointment:
[A]t the end of the season […] a couple of the young people from the Y drove me
around the neighborhood to show me all the projects. Of course this was
November. Things look gloomy in November. […] And I wasn’t saying much,
and the young man […] looked at me […] and said, “You don’t look very happy.”
I said, “Well, I was kind of hoping that I would see more… you know, more fixup for what we had invested.” And he said, “Oh, for crying out loud, you’re
looking for paint on houses.” He said, “You gotta be looking for raw wood. […]
You can’t paint raw wood right away.” So I said, “Well, what happened to all the
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paint?” And he said, “It’s stored for next year. They’re gonna do it.” (Emphasis
added 2011)
The staff member’s comments illustrate the ways in which socially constructed notions of
a landscape (and of what is to be valued in a landscape) can influence one individual who
then can influence the entire project.
The staff member’s emphasis on publicly visible aesthetic improvements
resembles the influence that Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist later had on the design of
new homes to be built in Lindsay Heights: he stipulated that new homes had to have a
porch big enough for him (a very tall man) to stretch out on (Interviews D and E 2011).
Both of these preferences can be traced to nostalgic notions of how good old-fashioned
neighborhoods are supposed to look.
Beyond the aesthetic concerns of planners and residents were the understandable
concerns residents had about an outside entity meddling in their neighborhood at all. The
neighborhood had already been scarred by the use of eminent domain in the 1960s to
clear homes from an area designated for highway construction that never materialized
(Figure 3-1). More recently, the city had used eminent domain to clear all homes from
several blocks in the area to enable the construction of the City Homes development.

Infill and Construction Stage
In contrast to the City Homes development, WHEDA chose to use a scattered site
infill approach to develop new homes among existing homes. This would make newer
homes less conspicuous and would make the redevelopment process less disruptive. After
attending a conference on the use of scattered infill housing in redevelopment initiatives,
WHEDA’s executive director, Fritz Ruf, and director of emerging markets, Wyman
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Winston, sought out ways to apply this approach in Milwaukee. They gained the support
of Governor Thompson and Mayor Norquist and negotiated a plan to pay the City of
Milwaukee $5,000 per lot for a total of $500,000 for “identification and pre-development
environmental review” of 100 lots that the city owned in the Lindsay Heights area
(WHEDA 2009, Interviews A and E 2011).
These lots would then be sold for $1.00 as long as buyers met certain criteria,
including a promise to build a residence on the site within one year. Financing was
secured for many new residents through low interest rate mortgages underwritten by
WHEDA. In many cases these new residents would not otherwise have qualified for a
standard loan. These new residents were also required to take home ownership classes
and pay down any outstanding debt and establish new bill-paying habits (Derus, 2000,
Interview B 2011). The City of Milwaukee established a Tax Incremental Finance
District or TID in 2001, which was the first TID for a residential neighborhood in
Milwaukee. The TID offered residents $10,000 in forgivable loans for new home
construction or for rehabilitation of existing properties (Interview B 2011). Table 3-2
outlines the private sector “partners” that collaborated with WHEDA in this development
strategy.
In addition to its partnership with the YMCA, established in the Paint and Fix-up
Initiative, WHEDA continued creating partnerships with local community organizations.
To date, their local partners have grown to include the Clarke Street Neighborhood
Association, the Johnson Park Neighborhood Association, the Phillis Wheatley
Neighborhood Association, the Saint Paul Resident Association and the Walnut Way
Conservation Corporation.
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Table 3-2: Lindsay Heights Partners
Lenders:
Eight lenders provided the upfront capital in the amount of $1.7 million needed to
Lindsay Heights Tax Incremental Financing District

start the

 State Financial Bank
 Mutual Savings Bank
 North Shore Bank
 St Francis Bank
 Northern Trust Bank
 M&I Bank
 Firstar Bank
 Guaranty Bank
(Note – LISC provided a 25% guarantee as an incentive to attract the local lending partners)

Lenders:
Nine lenders provided the additional capital in the amount of $1 million needed to
continue the Lindsay Heights Tax Incremental Financing District










State Financial Bank
Bank Mutual
North Shore Bank
MidAmerica (St Francis) Bank
Northern Trust Bank
M&I Bank
Guaranty Bank
Anchor Bank
Wells Fargo

Builders:





Duke Custom Homes
JR McBride Real Estate LLC
Kuhs Quality Homes
New Urban Builders

Real Estate Professionals:






Century 21 Realtors
Shorewest Realtors
Terapak Realtors
Williams & Associates
Homemark Realty

(Source: WHEDA Public Powerpoint, 2007)
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Both WHEDA and the City of Milwaukee wanted to keep the redevelopment
process market-driven and not tied to government subsidies, so WHEDA did not select
particular builders but opened the market to any interested builder. Builders were,
however, expected to “work within basic design and construction guidelines” (WHEDA
2009, Interview D 2011). WHEDA worked to arrange low-interest loans from local
lenders and to get local realtors to lower their commissions to 2.5% (WHEDA 2009). To
show buyers what was possible in Lindsay Heights, WHEDA paid for construction of
three model homes (Interview A 2011).
The first three homes, like many that followed, were prefabricated or modular
homes. This type of housing was chosen for several reasons. Due to the assembly line
manufacturing style of most modular homes, their cost is often lower than a site-built
home of similar size. Most of these homes consist of long narrow boxes that are married
together and or stacked on top of each other on site. These long, narrow boxes fit well on
the narrow lots that constitute many inner city lots. The speed with which these structures
can be assembled is also a benefit in an area that has higher than average crime rates,
since the cost of securing the construction site from theft and vandalism is kept to a
minimum. In addition to these attributes, many housing manufacturers offer exteriors that
mimic the styles found in early twentieth century construction. Many manufacturers offer
floor plans that are a reasonable facsimile of a bungalow or a workers cottage. This made
it possible for project organizers to adhere to Mayor Norquist’s New Urbanist principle
of maintaining architectural continuity.
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The Landscape of Nostalgia
While architectural continuity is a principle of New Urbanism, design of the new
structures served a symbolic purpose as well. In keeping with Mayor Norquist’s
celebration of the city versus the suburb, planning guidelines ostensibly attempted to
reinforce a sense of local character – to allow new owners to “return to the neighborhood
that they remembered,” as one WHEDA staff person stated (Interview A 2011). Real
Estate developer and philanthropist, Joe Zilber, reminisced about his childhood in this
same neighborhood, where his family lived above his parents’ store. He was quoted as
saying that he hoped that “current residents can enjoy the kind of prosperity families from
his era did”. Given his age, these childhood memories were drawn from the 1920’s and
1930’s, thus glossing over the lack of prosperity that most communities experienced
during the Great Depression. (Pabst 2008).
Given the age and original character of the neighborhood, that character would be
represented by the duplexes and workers’ cottages shown in Figures 3-2 and 3-3
respectively. Structures such as these were the dominant house-types of working-class
Milwaukee neighborhoods built from the late-nineteenth century to about 1910. The
workers cottage was more prevalent during mid- to late-nineteenth century development,
particularly in unskilled worker neighborhoods. The Milwaukee Duplex became the
dominant house type by the beginning of the twentieth century. Although Milwaukee had
a relatively high rate of homeownership at that time, as the prevalence of duplexes would
suggest, the majority of households rented (Hubka & Kenny 2006). The statistics shown
in Table 3-1 reaffirm the predominance of rental properties.
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Figure 3-2 Existing Workers Cottage in Study Area (Source: Author)

Figure 3-3: Existing Duplex in Study Area (Source: Author)
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In contrast to these typical house forms of the earlier era, new construction
sponsored by the Lindsay Heights project emphasizes larger houses. For example, the
relatively typical duplex shown in Figure 3-3, which has not undergone recent
renovation, can be compared to the new structure shown in Figure 3-4. One can discern
several architectural similarities that demonstrate continuity with the existing homes on
the street front: a large, covered front porch; wide siding with large trim boards
surrounding the windows; and box returns at the ends of the gables. However, despite its
architectural similarities, it is a single-family house intended for owner-occupancy. Thus,
while similar in mass, it serves as a different form of tenancy and a different level of
prosperity.

Figure 3-4: New Home in Study Area, Source: Author
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Figure 3-5: New Bungalow in Study Area (Source: Author)

In a comparable way, the new houses built in bungalow-style symbolically
represent a different social status and degree of modernity than do the Milwaukee worker
cottages (Figure 3-5). Bungalows would only be found in neighborhoods built after 1910,
and in Milwaukee, most were built after 1920. Despite the anachronism displayed by this
choice, it is understandable that the bungalow would be selected as an equivalent to the
cottage. The bungalow is the “gold standard” of early-twentieth housing in America. The
bungalow is widely viewed as one of the first homes to incorporate all of the modern
amenities that people expect in a home (Hubka lecture notes 2009). The style suggests
the comfortable, modern living of an aspiring middle-class. This type of nostalgia
markets the older neighborhoods to those who “remember” a period in which Milwaukee
had a more robust economy for industrial workers. Thus, in a nostalgic way – or perhaps
a New Urbanist one, they appeal to those who hope to bring in homeowners who can
raise property values and “prime the pump” for further development. However this does
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not resolve significantly the conditions of poverty for those already living in the
neighborhood.
Since 1995, over 160 new homes have been built in the Lindsay Heights area, and
over 350 existing buildings have been rehabilitated. These numbers fall significantly
short of those lost in the neighborhood since the end of World War II but they stand in as
a landscape honoring Milwaukee’s past – and the prospect of market-driven
development. In the next chapters, I will discuss the financial impact of this
redevelopment on the neighborhood and on the city as a whole.
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Chapter 4: Statistical Analysis of Changes in Lindsay Heights Property Values

Regression Analysis
This chapter utilizes regression analysis to try to establish the relationships that
may exist among different variables pertaining to housing stock in the Lindsay Heights
redevelopment area. In particular, I was concerned with home values and how they were
clustered, as well as how that clustering may have changed over the course of the
redevelopment project. I was also interested in determining which variables were
significant to home values and how their significance may have changed over time.
This analysis was designed to analyze the city of Milwaukee’s M-PROP data in
an effort to understand how the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project has influenced
residential property values in the neighborhood currently referred to as Lindsay Heights.
The City of Milwaukee property data from 1995, 2000 and 2005 for the parcels within
the boundaries of Lindsay Heights were acquired from the American Geographical
Society Library. In order to focus on residential properties, this data set was manipulated
in an effort to remove all non-residential parcels and all parcels without an assessed value
or a structure in place on the parcel.
After considering and calculating the different values that were available through
the Master Property Files (MPROP) for the City of Milwaukee that could be utilized to
perform the calculations necessary I determined that a map of assessed value per square
foot should be utilized to perform the statistical calculations. I then calculated for all
three data sets (Figure 4-1). Based on the spatial distribution of the map I determined that
further analysis of the data was necessary. I performed a basic statistical analysis of the
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assessed values, as well as a multiple linear regression analysis using the modified data
sets and Getis-Ord Gi* on all three data sets.

Figure 4-1: Lindsay Heights Map Showing Assessed Value Per Square Foot
(Source: City of Milwaukee M-PROP Data; Author’s Analysis)
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Results
I performed multiple linear regression analysis on all three data sets using SPSS
18. This analysis was designed to establish the effect of lot area, building area and value
per square foot on overall assessed value of the residential parcels in the study area. The
regression model for all three data sets was highly significant. For the 1995 data set these
three variables produced an R² of .839, which means that these three variables explain
83.9% of the variation of total assessed value. The 2000 model had an R² of .763 and the
2005 model saw its R² value drop to.631. This indicates that as we move forward
longitudinally these variables are explaining less and less of the variation. The F-values
for 1995, 2000 and 2005 were 3134.645, 1757.617 and 1009.664 respectively. The pvalues for the variables for all three data sets were significant at the 5% level. The
multicollinearity statistics were not an issue in any of the models as VIF values were well
fewer than five (see Appendix B).
One of the more interesting changes in the three models relates to the Beta. In
1995 parcel area was the most significant variable at 0.764; by 2000 it had fallen to
0.569, and by 2005 it was the least significant variable at just 0.149 (Appendix B). I will
discuss some possible reasons for this later in the chapter. This shift in Beta, along with
considerations for doing more detailed statistical analysis, led me to conclude that value
per square foot would be the most equitable value to employ for basic statistical analysis
and cluster analysis. Therefore, I calculated basic statistical analysis of value per square
foot for all parcels in the study area.
The statistic that may be the most puzzling is the total number of parcels, which
dropped from 1810 in 1995 to 1640 in 2000. This would represent a dramatic lack of
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infill in the first five years of a project deliberately geared toward infill. This reduction in
total parcels was a result of a concentrated effort to remove condemned homes from the
study area and to consolidate some parcels, most notably for the Josie Heights Project, for
which nearly four city blocks were cleared and consolidated for private development.
The other statistic that is of some significance is the global Moran’s I for all three
data sets. Global Moran’s I increases from 0.09 in 1995 to 0.37 by 2005, this, coupled
with an increasing z-score for all three data sets, indicates that assessed home values per
square foot are becoming more clustered over time. The other statistical consideration for
these data sets is the frequency distribution. It was positively skewed for all three data
sets, showing that the majority of the parcels have an assessed value per square foot of
less than $10.00 (Table 4-1).

Table 4-1 Assessed Value Per Square Foot: All Parcels
Total

Min.

Max.

Mean

St. Dv.

Moran’s I

z-score

pvalue

1995

1810

$0.51

$62.52

$8.30

5.204

0.09

15.91

0.00

2000

1640

$0.84

$64.95

$13.09

19.88

0.24

40.07

0.00

2005

1769

$1.20

$99.98

$25.24

19.82

0.37

52.69

0.00

(Source: City of Milwaukee MPROP Data; Author’s Analysis)

When all parcels are compared to parcels with homes built after 1995, very
distinctive trends develop. The data for parcels built after 1995 shows that the minimum
assessed value of homes went down dramatically between 2000 and 2005, while the
maximum value increased. The former statistic may be the result of a home that is under
construction being assessed before it is complete, or it could signify an increase in
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foreclosure rates. Again, Global Moran’s I calculations show an interesting trend. Global
Moran’s I goes down from 0.37 to 0.17 between 2000 and 2005. While this still indicates
a high degree of clustering it would seem to support the idea that the new homes being
built are less clustered (Table 4-2).

Table 4-2: Assessed Value Per Square Foot, Homes Built 1995-2005
Total

Min.

Max.

Mean

St. Dv.

Moran’s I

z-score

pvalue

2000

42

$36.33

$64.95

$50.63

8.55

0.37

6.11

0.00

2005

156

$1.20

$99.94

$80.80

14.66

0.17

7.46

0.00

(Source: City of Milwaukee MPROP Data; Author’s Analysis)

A calculation of assessed value for the three data sets showed a total assessed
value for all residential properties in Lindsay Heights in 1995 of $33,719,660. By 2000,
in spite of there being 170 fewer homes, the value had increased to $38,756,300. By
2005, with the addition of 156 new homes, the assessed value had jumped to
$86,076,855. This is an increase in assessed value of $47,320,555. The total value just of
the homes built after 1995 amounts to $23,357,355. The resulting figures indicate that the
new homes constructed between 1995 and 2005 had an average assessed value of
$149,727 per home. These numbers indicate that the remaining $23,963,200 (over half of
all increases measured) are the result of increases in the assessed value of the
approximately 1600 already existing homes in Lindsay Heights. Considering the rather
low increase of $5,036,640 in overall assessed value between 1995 and 2000 (while
considering a net loss of 170 homes), it seems that new home placement within Lindsay
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Heights may have had a strong influence on the assessed value of existing properties
within the study area.
When analyzing only homes built after 1995 for value per square foot the
statistics indicate that the 156 homes built had a minimum value per square foot of $1.20,
a maximum value of $99.98 and a mean of $80.80 with a frequency distribution that was
quite negatively skewed. These figures would indicate that while there is new
development in the study area this new development is providing homes at a price level
quite different than what is otherwise available.
Finally, I generated Getis-Ord Gi* maps to try to establish where high and low
assessed value per square foot homes were clustered. I used a Getis-Ord Gi* map
generated from the 1995 data set as a baseline to compare how clustering may have
changed as a result of the redevelopment project. The 1995 map shows clustering of
higher value parcels in the north-west portion of the study area and clustering of lower
value parcels in the south-west part of the study area (Figure 4-2). A Getis-Ord Gi*map
for all residential parcels from the 2005 data set show significant clustering of low value
parcels across the northern part of the study area and a clustering of high value parcels
across the southern portion of the study area (Figure 4-3). A third Getis-Ord Gi* map was
generated using 2005 data but with all the parcels that had been built on since 1995
removed. This map was generated to try to display what assessed value per square foot
might look like if no redevelopment had taken place. This map clearly shows a cluster of
high value parcels in the middle and at the extreme south edge of the study area with
concentrations of low value parcels found in the north-west and south-central portions of
the study area (Figure 4-4).
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Figure 4-2: Lindsay Heights Map Showing Getis-Ord Gi* for 1995 Parcels (Source: City of
Milwaukee M-PROP Data; Author’s Analysis)
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Figure 4-3: Lindsay Heights Map Showing Getis-Ord Gi* for All Parcels (Source: City of Milwaukee
M-PROP Data; Author’s Analysis)
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Figure 4-4: Lindsay Heights Map Showing Getis-Ord Gi* for 1880-1995 Parcels
(Source: City of Milwaukee M-PROP Data; Author’s Analysis)
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Conclusions
It seems rather clear that the new development that is taking place in Lindsay
Heights has had a positive effect for the city of Milwaukee. The new homes have been
located on parcels that were already zoned for housing which means that their presence
has increased the local tax base significantly. The $23,357,533 of assessed value for the
156 new homes means that less than 10% of the homes in the study area are currently
generating over one quarter of the over-all assessed value of the entire study area (1769
parcels).
The results of the regression analysis appear significant; however, the dramatic
shift in Beta is troublesome. This shift may be the result of other factors such as number
of bedrooms or number of baths taking on more significance when assessing value.
Unfortunately, because these are string variables in the data set they could not be factors
in the regression analysis. One likely hypothesis is that the new homes being built in
Lindsay Heights, while maintaining a similar square-footage as the existing home stock
in the neighborhood, had a much higher assessed value. Therefore, while lot size
remained constant, the new homes were displaying a much higher value per square foot
when compared to the existing homes. Other factors that may have had an impact on the
regression analysis could be inflated property values as the result of the housing bubble
(which had not burst yet).
The results of global Moran’s I indicate increased clustering of homes of a similar
value over time when all parcels are considered but a decrease when only new homes are
considered. Perhaps the most interesting result comes from the Getis-Ord Gi* maps. The
maps show a clear shift in the location of high assessed value homes since the start of the
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redevelopment project. This shift is made all the more clear when compared to Figure 41. What is perhaps most interesting is the increase in high value assessments that seem to
be located in the area that received the most intense redevelopment. This may be the
strongest indicator that current redevelopment is affecting existing home values. This
could have positive effects on the neighborhood; however, a dramatic increase could
result in the displacement of current residents.
The purpose of this statistical analysis was to try to ascertain, through the data and
programs available, if there were indications that the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment
Project was affecting property values of existing homes within the study area, and if so,
was that effect significant. While the results of the analysis have proved to be
informative, there are several areas of this statistical analysis that would benefit from
further research. One approach that might generate more accurate results would be to
isolate the parcels with new homes on them and create a buffer around those homes. This
would allow the researcher to concentrate on the existing homes in the immediate vicinity
of new construction. This might allow for a more accurate assessment of how
redevelopment is affecting home values in the study area. Another approach would be to
isolate homeowners’ names from the data set in an effort to confirm whether they are the
owner-occupant of the parcel, and determine whether there has been a high turnover rate
in the study area. This may give an indication of whether or not displacement is occurring
and, if it is, at what rate.
These considerations led me to conclude that a more fine-grained analysis of
isolated block fronts would result in a fuller understanding of how, and to what degree,
redevelopment has altered the existing neighborhood known as Lindsay Heights.
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Chapter 5: Lindsay Heights Project Houses in the Neighborhood
Block Level Analysis
When evaluating the impact of the new construction and renovations associated
with the Lindsay Heights project, one must acknowledge that it adds housing
improvements of 165 new and 221 renovated units in an area of 2522 units prior to the
beginning of its activity (Figure 3-6). When considering a comparison to the number of
units in 1940, a time associated with its relatively stable working-class neighborhood of
6283 houses (Figure 3-1), the impact of 386 units hardly corrects for the loss. Keeping in
mind its incremental addition to the neighborhood’s overall inventory, we might also
acknowledge that despite its “scatter site” approach the new homes are not being built in
all areas of the neighborhood. Field observation and City of Milwaukee property data
have shown a pattern of high redevelopment in the southwest portion of Lindsay Heights,
with less redevelopment occurring in the north and northwest portions of the
neighborhood. This points to uneven development within the project boundaries, or a
limitation to just how “scattered” the infill is. Field research indicates that this is the
result of some block groups experiencing much more clustered redevelopment.
Based on the findings from the analysis of the data from the previous chapter, and
this pattern of development that at times defies the definition of scattered, I believe that a
more fine-grained analysis of the neighborhood is warranted in order to understand the
impact of new construction in Lindsay Heights. To perform this analysis I identified four
blocks to study: three sample blocks and one control (Figure 5-1). All four blocks consist
of the housing stock located on a single city block where the homes face each other and
share a common street. These “face front” blocks were selected based on criteria that will

62

give some insight into how new construction has affected the community. The criteria for
establishing the three study blocks relied on visual inspection of the face front blocks to
establish blocks that had a mixture of homes (new, pre-existing and refurbished). The
control block was chosen for its lack of new or refurbished homes as well as its low
number of empty lots. This chapter will provide a quantitative analysis of these blocks to
evaluate the affects that the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project has had on the
community. 1
Once the study blocks had been established I performed statistical analysis of the
properties using MPROP data from the city of Milwaukee. I collected the MPROP data
for the study areas for 1995 (the first year of the project), 2000, 2005 and 2010. The
primary data consisted of build year, square footage, assessed value, owner-occupancy,
and the tenure of the owner of the home. This data should indicate whether the
construction of new homes on these blocks has had a positive or negative affect on home
values in the community, and to what extent.

1

The criteria for establishing the three study blocks relied on visual inspection of the face front
blocks to establish blocks that had a mixture of homes (new, pre-existing and refurbished). The
control block was chosen for its lack of new or refurbished homes as well as its low number of
empty lots. This chapter will provide a quantitative analysis of these blocks to evaluate the affects
that the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project has had on the community.
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Figure 5-1: Map Showing Sample Block Groups and Control Group (Source: Google Maps)
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Group A is located on the 1700 block of W. Wright St. within the Phillis Wheatley
Neighborhood. Group B is located on the 1900 block of N. 18th St. in the Johnson Park
Neighborhood. Group C is located on the 1900 block of N. 15th St. in the Walnut Way
Neighborhood, and the Control Group is located on the 2500 block of N. 16th St., which
straddles the Phillis Wheatley neighborhood to the west and the Clarke Street
Neighborhood to the east. All these neighborhoods are contained within the Lindsay
Heights redevelopment area (Figure 5-1).

Assessed Values
I compared assessed values in the three study areas with the control group to
determine whether the construction of new homes affected the values of the existing
homes on the block. It is often complicated to apply assessed value data to case studies
because they do not exist in a vacuum. Market forces, deterioration, rehabilitation and the
sale of the home are just a few of the factors that can impact assessed value. For the
purposes of this evaluation it will be assumed that the various complicating factors have
had an equal impact on the homes in the study area, and consideration for measurable
factors will be noted. Another complicating factor is determining what an increase in
assessed value does to neighborhood stability. It can be argued that increases positively
affect homeowners by increasing the equity in their homes; however large increases in
assessed value often result in large increases in tax assessments, which low-income or
fixed-income residents may not be able to afford, and might result in their displacement.
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When analyzing the assessed value data for the case study areas there are a few
trends that stand out. It is rather easy to categorize the data into two groups, 1995-2000
and 2005-2010. The reason for this is two-fold. First, when evaluating groups A, B and
C, 14 of the 16 new homes were constructed after 2000. This creates a rather abrupt line
of delineation in the construction record with existing homes residing in the pre-2005
data set and almost all of the new construction happening after 2000. The second, and
perhaps more important, trend is the dramatic increase in assessed value for all of the
homes, in all four groups, between 2000 and 2005. With the exception of a few increases,
between 1995 and 2000 assessed values remained rather constant. However, between
2000 and 2005 the value of the properties in all four groups increased by an average of
263.24%. When comparing the assessed values of all the homes in all four groups, the
values are nearly identical in 2005 and 2010.
For group A, the average assessed value for 1995 was $17,325. In 2000 it
increased slightly to $17,550. In 2005 that average jumped to $107,683 and by 2010 it
had increased to $107,750. Group B had an average assessed value of $10,244 in 1995;
by 2000 it had increased to $16,980. In 2005 group B’s average had gone up to $87,806
and by 2010 average values had increased to $87,912. The average assessed value of
group C was $7,883 in 1995; in 2000 it had more than doubled to $16,514, primarily due
to the construction of a home in 1999 that had an assessed value of over $50,000. By
2005 the average had leaped to $83,711 and remained the same in 2010. The control
group had an average assessed value of $25,000 in 1995; by 2000 it had increased to
$38,000. In 2005 the average reached $87,200 and remained the same in 2010.
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When trying to reconcile how such an abrupt leap in assessed value can happen in
such a short time period two causes come to mind. The first is the housing bubble, which
in 2005 had yet to burst. This variable would be difficult to quantify and should affect all
of the homes in the study area fairly similarly. Taking into account city-wide increases in
assessed home values during these same years provides, at least, some context for
comparison. The second variable is home resale. One of the quickest ways for a home to
increase in assessed value is through sale. If a homeowner has owned or lived in a home
for a number of years the home’s assessed value is often predicated on the price of the
home when it was purchased. Therefore, residents with a long tenure in a particular
community may have an assessed value for their home that is well below market value.
However, if they sell their home assessed value can jump dramatically.
Fortunately, this case study allowed me to make comparisons between homes that
had been sold between 2000 and 2005 and those whose owners had remained constant
throughout the 15 year analysis. The data indicates that the average increase in value for
homes that had been sold between 2000 and 2005 was 265.69%, while the average
increase in value for homes with a constant owner throughout the study period was
255.25%. The small difference between homes that changed ownership and those that did
not suggests that home sales were not a significant factor in the massive increase in home
values between 2000 and 2005.
Average assessed value for the four groups must also be considered to try to
establish whether or not new home construction has affected the value of existing homes
in the community. In 1995 the assessed values of the homes in all four groups were rather
varied, with a maximum of $17,325 (group A) and a minimum of $7883 (group C), with
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the control group averaging at $15,180. Over the 15 year study period group A saw an
average increase in value of 320%, group B saw an average increase of 255%, group C
increased its value by 277%, and the control group recorded an average increase of 199%
(Tables 5-1 through 5-4). While all of these increases are rather significant, groups A, B
and C obviously saw increases much greater than that of the control group. These
numbers seem even more remarkable when you consider that the median home value in
the city as a whole increased 49.5% between 2000 and 2005 (Johnson and Derus 2006).
While this number is certainly not insignificant, it is far below that of even the control
group. This might suggest that even blocks which have had no development may be
benefiting from the new construction that has taken place elsewhere in Lindsay Heights.
These large increases in assessed value suggest that the neighborhood has improved, that
homeowners have increased equity and the city’s tax base is expanding. But have these
increases displaced existing residents? Has this shift to much higher home values
alleviated the existing economic and social issues in the neighborhood?
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Table 5-1: Study Group A Assessed Values 1995-2010
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Table 5-2: Study Group B Assessed Values 1995-2010
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Table 5-3: Study Group C Assessed Values 1995-2010
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Table 5-4: Control Group Assessed Values 1995-2010
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Owner-Occupancy Data
One common measure of neighborhood stability is owner-occupancy. Many
people believe that if a neighborhood has a high level of owner-occupants it engenders a
sense of community and pride that is lacking in neighborhoods with a high turnover rate
or a high number of renters. In 1995 block group A had an owner-occupancy rate of
44.4%, with three of the eight homes being owner-occupied (Table 5-5). By 2000 the
percentage had risen to 50%. In spite of the number of homes in group A increasing by
six between 2000 and 2010, the percentage of owner-occupants only rose to 66.7%.
Block group B has a more complicated narrative due to some inconsistencies in the data
as well as a more vigorous sales market. The data indicates that owner-occupancy and
tenure were much more volatile in this block group, with only four of the 17 homes
retaining their original owner for the entire study period (Table 5-6). However, unlike
group A, group B’s owner-occupancy rate had reached 83.33% by 2000 and held firm at
82.35% in 2005 and 2010. Block group C consisted of six existing structures in 1995, of
which only two were owner-occupied (Table 5-7). By 2000 homes and owner-occupancy
had increased by one, raising the percentage of owner-occupied homes in the block group
to 42.86%. With the addition of two new homes and three new occupants by 2005, the
percentage of owner-occupied homes in group C rose to 66.67% in 2005 and remained
constant in 2010. In 1995 the control block had an owner-occupancy rate of 46.67%; by
2000 the rate had fallen slightly to 43.75%. In 2005 the percentage had returned to
46.67%, but by 2010 it had fallen to 40%.
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Table 5-5: Group A Owner Occupancy 1995-2010
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Table 5-6: Group B Owner Occupancy 1995-2010
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Table 5-7: Group C Owner Occupancy 1995-2010
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Table 5-8: Control Group Owner Occupancy 1995-2010
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This data indicates that block groups A, B and C all either maintained or increased
their owner-occupancy rates over the course of the 15 year study, while the control group
ultimately had fewer owner-occupants at the end of the study period (Table 5-8). An
obvious contributing factor to the increases experienced by block groups A and C is the
fact that most of the people that purchased/constructed the new homes on the blocks have
maintained their owner-occupied status, while a handful of homes in the control group
have gone from private ownership to that of a property management company or a bank.
Overall, this data suggests that new construction appears to have a stabilizing impact on
owner-occupancy rates in the study area.

Tenure
In addition to owner-occupancy, another stabilizing factor in neighborhoods can be
measured by the tenure of the residents in a given community. For example, in block
group A, of the eight homes that were built between 1893 and 1914, only three (38%)
maintained ownership by the same individual throughout the 15 years of the case study.
In group B, of the 13 homes that existed in 1995, only four (31%) maintained consistent
ownership over the course of the study period. For group C it was two of six existing
homes (33%), while in the control group, of the 17 homes listed, six (35%) maintained
consistent ownership. These percentages do not indicate a major difference in tenure
between blocks that experienced significant redevelopment and the one that did not.
In Group A the remaining homes have changed hands at some point during the
study period. In most cases, the homes changed hands between 2000 and 2005. This
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holds true for groups B, C, and the control group. So while tenure is sporadic, it does
appear to maintain itself within a decade-long period. The data indicates that even when
they do change hands, tenure lasts for at least 10 years.
Because of the burst of the housing bubble one of the most interesting things about
the data is that when analyzing the new homes that have been built in block groups A, B,
and C, none of them have been sold since they were constructed, with the exception of
one home in group C that is now owned by DeutscheBank. Out of the 16 new homes
represented in the three block groups, only one is not owned by the original owner.
Given the City of Milwaukee’s housing bubble, many homeowners across the
county have avoided selling their homes because market value may have dropped.
However, the apparently minimal occurrence of foreclosure (on new homes) in these
study groups indicates that the individuals or groups that oversaw the financing of this
new construction did their job. Given the City of Milwaukee’s commitment to the New
Urbanist principle of conformity to local architectural styles, questions might be raised
regarding to the “fit” of these new homes within the context of the neighborhood. How
well do the new Lindsay Heights properties respond to “place” concerns?

Architectural Continuity of Size in New Construction
Two factors are important when it comes to architectural continuity: aesthetic
consistency and relative consistency of size. The types of existing structures within
Lindsay Heights tended to be Worker’s Cottages or duplexes. However, when
introducing scattered infill into the project area, single-family homes were the primary
objective. Yet twenty-first century home-buyers are apt to want certain amenities that
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simply aren’t available in the cottages built between 1880 and 1915. New homeowners
expect more square footage, open floor plans and different facilities, such as more
bathrooms or larger closets or kitchens. Therefore, some sort of compromise had to be
managed between the conventional size of the homes in the area and the optimal size of
new homes. Cottages were too small; duplexes were too large.
Therefore, it is important to look at the square footage of the new homes that were
built in the three study groups and compare it to the square footage of existing homes and
the control group homes. The data indicates that in block group A, the new construction
of single-family homes was actually below the average size of existing homes. It is
noteworthy that many of the existing structures in group A were duplexes, while the new
homes were all single-family homes. Group B is somewhat different, as it has the largest
variation in square footage for existing homes, ranging from 878 square feet to 2348
square feet. The new construction in this block group was between 1536 and 2086 square
feet. This indicates that the new construction stayed within the parameters of existing
home stock square footage, however it must be pointed out that, as with most of the new
construction in Lindsay Heights, while the mass of the structure was within the
parameters of existing home stock their purposes were quite different. Many of the
existing homes of that size were duplexes (see Figure 5-2). The new construction in these
areas that is of a similar size is primarily single family homes (see Figure 5-3).
Block group C had the smallest average square footage in existing homes;
however, the new homes were well within those parameters and tended to attempt to
evoke a “modern bungalow” style – but with a square footage that was 500-600 square
feet larger than existing “bungalow” cottages.
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Architectural Continuity of Appearance in New Construction
As discussed in the previous chapter, Figure 5-3 also demonstrates the ways some
new homes have gone beyond the simpler architecture of the older homes, including
features that are not so much consistent with the actual simple architecture of the original
building period in the area but may reflect a nostalgic or romanticized notion of what old
homes in general are supposed to look like. Interestingly, these features, such as such as
divided windows, a wrap-around porch, and faux shutters, in some ways reflect
architectural patterns more commonly found in rural or small town communities rather
than in densely packed urban areas—where a wraparound porch would likely butt against
a neighbor’s wall or alley.
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Figure 5-2: Existing Duplex in Group A Study Area (Source: Author)

Figure 5-3: New Home in Group A Study Area (Source: Author)
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Figure 5-4: New Bungalow in Group C Study Area (Source: Author)

Figure 5-5 Existing Worker’s Cottage in Group C Study Area (Source: Author)
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Figure 5-4 exemplifies new construction that mimics a traditional one-and-a-half
story bungalow with a reasonably steep roofline with dormers, and a full, covered front
porch. In contrast, an existing worker’s cottage located two doors down (Figure 5-5)
shares some of the general architectural attributes of the new construction but is in fact
lacking some of the very elements the City of Milwaukee required of new construction –
a large, covered front porch, or a steeper pitched roof.
Sometimes, they missed the continuity mark completely (Figure 5-6). However,
the fact that this home stands out as an exception does demonstrate the extent to which
the City’s emphasis on architectural continuity was successful.

Figure 5-6: New Home in Group C Study Area (Source: Author)
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Rehabilitation
It is more difficult to track renovations done to existing homes, but visual
inspection of these block groups does reveal obvious significant home improvements to
certain homes. Block group A has two existing structures that have had rehabilitation.
One home (#1718) had vinyl siding installed, a modern roof shingle installed, and a high
efficiency furnace. The other structure (#1727) had vinyl siding and a modern roof
shingle installed. In group B two existing structures were rehabilitated. One (#1947)
received vinyl siding, while another (#1906) received vinyl siding, modern roof shingles,
and a high efficiency furnace. For group C, four of the six existing structures had some
rehabilitation. #1932 (Figure 5-7) and #1959 received new vinyl siding; #1942 and #1947
received vinyl siding, modern roof shingles, and a high efficiency furnace. In the control
group, three homes: #2523 and 2538 both received new vinyl siding, while #2564
received new vinyl siding and a high efficiency furnace.

Figure 5-7: Existing Worker’s Cottage from Group C that Underwent Rehabilitation
Source: Author
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Conclusion
Based on the analysis of select block groups in the Lindsay Heights redevelopment
area, it is clear that the “scattered site” infill was not all that scattered, which indicates
uneven development within the project area. Property values for all the parcels that were
analyzed displayed dramatic increases when compared to the city of Milwaukee as a
whole, especially between 2000 and 2005. However, property values in the control group
increased at a significantly lower rate than the other study block groups.
The analysis shows that the project has led to stability within the project area; all of
the new homes remain owner-occupied. Groups A, B, and C all showed an increase in
occupancy rates during the project, while the control group occupancy rates fell
consistently during the years analyzed. In addition to owner-occupancy rates, tenure
within all of the study groups was strong; however, it is difficult to determine whether
part of that could be due to the real estate bubble bursting, which may have left
homeowners unable to sell their homes.
While a decent attempt was made with regard to architectural continuity, it is clear
from field observations that often the size of a newly constructed single-family home is
similar to that of a pre-existing duplex. In addition, the new “bungalows” were often
substantially larger than the worker’s cottages located nearby. So while there is some
measure of continuity in the architecture, that continuity was perhaps compromised for
the sake of consumer desires.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Overview
Given the neighborhood’s poverty statistics in 1994, WHEDA selected Lindsay
Heights as the focus of its development efforts and launched a renovation and house
construction agenda. According to WHEDA, the primary goals of the Lindsay Heights
redevelopment project were to beautify the neighborhood, promote neighborhood
stability and pride, create scattered infill, spur investment, increase the Milwaukee tax
base, and create a more mixed-income community (WHEDA 2009). These initiatives
were also designed to promote owner-occupancy of the newly constructed homes and to
inspire existing homeowners to make further improvements to their homes and
neighborhood as a whole.
As the previous chapters indicate, the project does seem to have had some
measurable success in these goals. Property values did go up disproportionately; the tax
base increased; and 165 vacant sites were filled. By introducing new construction to
neighborhoods whose existing housing stock was built mostly around 1900, developers
virtually guaranteed that the neighborhoods where these new homes were built would be
mixed-income, due to the drastic differences in home value between new and existing
homes. The increase in tax base stemming from new homes, therefore, was probably at
least somewhat predictable; however, the increase in tax base from neighboring homes
was less of a sure thing. It seems clear, based on the findings from Chapter 5, that the
new housing stock increased the value of existing homes.
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New Urbanist Goals
The redevelopment project also appears to have honored several of the principles
of New Urbanism, such as the emphasis on reinforcing the architectural and historical
flavor of the area. A few other principles in particular are worth noting in connection with
the data collected here. Principle Four of the New Urbanism charter promotes infill
development to help curtail urban sprawl (Grimshaw 2000). Infill of urban areas can
certainly help to reduce sprawl, but it also has other benefits. Infill is an environmentally
sound practice. Because it utilizes land that has already been given over to development,
it can save arable land or green space at the periphery of an urban area. If this infill
results in mixed use neighborhoods it can reduce commuting between city and suburbs,
thereby reducing strains on the environment, infrastructure, and help to lessen the effects
of spatial mismatch. Infill also has economic benefits, such as increased tax base and
potential investment in the community by small businesses, which can bring both jobs
and retail outlets. Breaking the cycle of disinvestment in urban areas and curtailing
sprawl are but a few of the tenants at the core of New Urbanist ideals (Robbins 2004).
Principle Thirteen of the charter calls for neighborhoods to contain a broad range
of housing types at various price levels. By providing different housing options it is
believed that neighborhoods will be more diverse, both socially and economically.
Ideally this diversity would not just be represented by mixed income but also by people
of different cultures and ages coming together to form a community. The wide range of
home values demonstrated in this study at least demonstrates a degree of mixed wealth,
which likely—at this level of home price—indicates a mix of incomes.
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The ideal of branding and community pride is also evident in the Lindsay Heights
project – even if it was dependent on a narrative of the market, and market-driven
development defining success (Pabst 2008). As faulty as that narrative has proven to be
in the recent past, with the real estate market bubble’s burst, the very act of naming this
part of the city creates an opportunity for residents to feel membership and ownership,
and ideally, pride. A number of recent initiatives such as community gardens and
community associations (albeit separate from the WHEDA public/private partnership)
both demonstrate and promote increased enthusiasm among residents for their
neighborhood. The Zilber Neighborhood Initiative has even created a map of the
neighborhood that, with its cartoon icons, resembles the maps for tourist attractions or
theme parks and highlights such distinctive neighborhood establishments such as “Coffee
Makes You Black” and “Heart of the Neighborhood” (Figure 6-1).
The market-driven construction that was praised when launching the Zilber
Neighborhood Initiative failed to take off with the recent stagnation of the real estate
market. Now, however, that there are signs of some recovery. Will the activity resume?
The Josey Heights subdivision is being promoted without any hint of its recent stagnation
– and notice of the “opportunity” of purchasing a new home is posted on the district
alderman’s web site. As indicated at that site, Alderman Hines notes that the promise is:
This project could result in an estimated $10 million in additional tax base to the
neighborhood. There is a demand in the central city for market-driven housing at
all prices and income ranges, and Josey Heights will build on the success of the
Lindsay Heights homes and provide more economic stability for the area.
(Hines 2006)
Neighborhood residents acknowledge the challenges to their neighborhood in terms of
the health of the real estate market. The Lindsay Heights “Quality of Life Plan” notes a
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Figure 6-1: Zilber Neighborhood Initiative Map of Lindsay Heights (Source: znimilwaukee.org)
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six percent foreclosure rate for the neighborhood in 2008 as compared to a two percent
rate for the country as a whole (Zilber 2013). The entrepreneurial tone of the city,
WHEDA, and even – at times – the neighborhood, reflects the contemporary form of
governance. Being hesitant to engage in undue cynicism, the positive tone associated
with any form of boosterism and/or promotion does not guarantee success but may be
required for success in reviving a flagging local economy.

Sustainability
Manufactured housing seems to be a good solution for scattered site infill for the
reasons described in previous chapters, but it also has a down side. Historically,
manufactured housing has had lower rates of appreciation than site-built housing
depending on how it is titled and where it is located. Moreover, housing construction is
one of the last industries that are truly local. While it is true that the material to construct
site-built homes is often shipped in from great distances, the assembly of those materials
is typically done on site by skilled or semi-skilled workers who are often either from the
city where they are working or from somewhere nearby. This type of home construction
has been a critical part of many local economies and is often considered an important
indicator of economic well-being. Manufactured housing can strip localities of this flow
of capital. Not only are the homes built elsewhere, but the specialized equipment and
techniques required to assemble them often means that the assembly is done by nonlocals as well. In this sense, competition for resources to quickly create affordable infill
housing can result in a short-term win for some home-owners but a long-term drawback
to the larger economic health of a city.
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Addressing the Underlying Problems that Caused the Neighborhood’s Decline
Measuring the success of the redevelopment project in terms of its own stated
goals can make it easy to overlook important outcomes that the project never set out to
achieve in the first place. While it was a study on poverty that sparked the project,
virtually no aspect of the redevelopment project has directly addressed the root causes of
that poverty. A different plan might have focused on job or job-training programs, on
improvements to schools or affordable daycare, or on attracting commercial ventures that
might provide jobs to which these residents, according to New Urbanist principles, could
walk. While an increase in home equity can be a tremendous positive for some homeowners (provided they can afford increased property taxes), the poorest residents are
more likely to be renters. WHEDA’s emphasis on beautifying the neighborhood might
not just mask the poverty behind the facades, but actually displace the impoverished,
moving the problem around and making it harder to track, rather than solving it.
Despite the general American emphasis on the importance of home-ownership
and self-reliance, as Ghose has noted (2005), building homes is not a panacea. In Lindsay
Heights, the new homes, with their much higher assessed values, may have the effect of
skewing the demographics so that the census tracts do not look so impoverished. The
changes in census tracts in 2010 will also make it more difficult to track the economic
health of area residents, because Lindsay Heights is now spread out over nine census
tracts, and not a single one of them contains a significant portion of Lindsay Heights.
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Conclusion
I have attempted to show how the redevelopment of Milwaukee’s Lindsay
Heights neighborhood is the result of a particular form of neoliberalism that manifests
itself through slightly nuanced neoliberal processes such as quasi-public-private
partnerships as well as specific branding of the city that embraces working class values
and New Urbanist development philosophies. The branding of the city as a “genuine
American city” and the promotion of New Urbanist ideology allowed city leaders to trade
on Milwaukee’s working class heritage to create a sense of place that promoted hard
work and perseverance over government handouts. That the public-private partnership
launched by WHEDA addressed the needs of a low-income neighborhood at least went
beyond the prevalent form of entrepreneurial governance that had promoted the
Downtown’s redevelopment as a means of bringing the middle-class back into the city as
consumers or residents (Kenny & Zimmerman 2003).
There is still much to be done in order to better understand how Milwaukee’s
neoliberal policies are shaping the urban environment in general and the Lindsay Heights
redevelopment project in particular. Having a better understanding of who is moving to
Lindsay Heights may provide further insight into how policy is shaping the city. Is the
call of New Urbanism really enticing suburbanites back to the city? How do these new
residents feel about their new environment? How do the city of Milwaukee and WHEDA
perceive the success of the project? Answers to these questions may provide better
insight about where the redevelopment project is headed in the future.
It would appear that the entrepreneurial role of the city in the Lindsay Heights
redevelopment project is quite different from traditional roles the city often takes.
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WHEDA, along with some local residents of Lindsay Heights, deserve a great deal of
credit for the success of the project. Part of that success appears to be the result of
WHEDA stepping outside of its traditional roles as in overseer of mortgage lending and
becoming more involved in the entrepreneurial aspects of development.
There are also other issues remaining that should be addressed. The Lindsay
Heights redevelopment project represents a winner in the battle for funds, but Lindsay
Heights represents only a small portion of the economically depressed communities in
Milwaukee who did not win. And while the numbers indicate that the Lindsay Heights
redevelopment project has been a success, there are still questions about whether or not
these successes have addressed the underlying initial problem identified by Fannie Mae
back in 1994.
What is clear is that given the correct economic situation, redevelopment projects
like Lindsay Heights can succeed. What remains to be established is whether or not these
types of projects can bring lasting change to a community and address the socioeconomic problems that put such neighborhoods and their residents into such precarious
positions in the first place.
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APPENDIX A

Figure A-1: Lindsay Heights Census Tract Map 1940-1960
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Figure A-2: Lindsay Heights Census Tract Map 1970-2000

Table A-1: 1940 Census Tract Data for Area that Becomes Lindsay Heights
Census Tracts**

27/118

28/117

37/102

38/101

50/86

51/85

LH
Consolidated

Population Total
White
Black
White Foreign Born
Other

3186
2454
0
730
2

3353
2571
0
781
1

4560
3406
1
1153
0

3609
2766
0
843

3676
2971
0
705
0

3828
3089
0
739
0

22212
17257
1
4951
3

Median Income
% High School
Graduates
% Below Poverty Line

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

903
229

992
185

1245
307

984
289

1061
361

1098
348

6283
1719

653

720

923

676

681

734

4387

21
$3,032

37
$2,671

15
$3,376

19
$3,274

18
$3,504

16
$3,483

126
$3,223

Housing
Total Stock
Owner Occupied
Black
White
Rental
Black
White
Vacant Lots
Median Home Value $

City of
Milwaukee

$4,084

(avg. of medians)

*

Census tract numbers changed in 1970. The number after the slash indicates the new number starting in 1970.
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Table A-2: 1950 Census Tract Data for Area that Becomes Lindsay Heights
27/118
3135
2680
23
431
1

28/117
3158
2618
102
428
10

37/102
4380
3531
81
766
2

38/101
3604
3004
2
592
6

50/86
3425
2972
2
449
2

51/85
3585
3102
17
460
6

LH
Consolidated
21287
17907
227
3126
27

Median Income $

3324

2888

3180

3256

3731

3455

3305.67

% High School
Graduates

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

% Below Poverty Line

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Housing
Total Stock
Owner Occupied
Black
White

919
310
3
307

945
266
9
257

1275
410
10
400

1097
360
0
360

1108
447
0
447

1102
438
5
433

6446
2231
27
2204

Rental
Black
White

603
0
603

700
17
683

867
8
859

727
2
725

635
0
635

646
1
645

4178
28
4150

11
$6,529

5
$6,316

16
$6,917

12
N/A

26
$8,563

24
$8,102

94
$7,285

Census Tracts*
Population Total
White
Black
White Foreign Born
Other

Vacant Lots
Median Home Value $

City of
Milwaukee

3340

$11,086

(avg. of medians)
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Table A-3: 1960 Census Tract Data for Area that Becomes Lindsay Heights
27/118
3066
1093
1912
0
69

28/117
2960
646
2308
0
6

37/102
4234
898
3326
0
10

38/101
3569
1249
2344
0
54

50/86
3503
1584
1893
0
26

51/85
3305
1063
2211
0
31

LH
Consolidated
20637
6533
13994
0
196

4972

4477

4694

5516

5968

5385

5168.67

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

Housing
Total Stock
Owner Occupied
Black
White

827
226
78
148

914
184
87
97

1157
312
170
142

1010
289
133
156

1055
401
133
268

963
367
176
191

5926
1779
777
1002

Rental
Black
White

567
374
193

649
487
162

792
629
163

670
401
269

592
335
257

547
363
184

3817
2589
1228

34
$8,500

81
$8,300

130
$8,200

51
$11,400

62
$8,600

49
$9,200

407
$9,033

Census Tracts*
Population Total
White
Black
Foreign Born
Other
Median Income $
% High School
Graduates
% Below Poverty Line

Vacant Lots
Median Home Value

City of
Milwaukee

5694

$15,100

(avg. of medians)
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Table A-4: 1970 Census Tract Data for Area that Becomes Lindsay Heights
Census Tracts

27/118

28/117

37/102

38/101

50/86

LH
Consolidated

51/85

City of
Milwaukee

Population Total
White
Black
Foreign Born
Other

2028
204
1812

1390
85
1294

2599
96
2497

2319
102
2212

3495
234
3257

2863
139
2685

14694
860
13757

12

11

6

5

4

39

77

Median Income $

$5,952

$5,179

$3,619

$5,408

$8,100

$7,136

$5,899
(avg. of means)

$10,262

% High School
Graduates

25.7

22.2

16.3

23.4

30.1

25.6

49.2

% Below Poverty Line

29.2

38.4

46.4

32.7

24.1

25.6

23.88
(avg. of means)
32.73

Housing
Total Stock
Owner Occupied
Black
White

616
122
79
43

423
77
50
22

785
149
130
19

749
160
131
29

1065
324
267
57

895
272
231
41

4533
1104
888
211

Rental
Black
White

437
397
40

307
291
16

577
551
26

511
481
30

654
611
43

561
531
30

3047
2862
185

58
$6,400

48
$6,500

66
$7,700

85
$8,300

109
$8,700

86
$8,900

452
$7,750
(avg. of means)

Vacant Lots
Median Home Value $

8.1

$18,200
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Table A-5: 1980 Census Tract Data for Area that Becomes Lindsay Heights
Census Tracts
Population Total
White
Black
Foreign Born
Other
Non-Black

27/118

28/117

37/102

38/101

50/86

LH
Consolidated

51/85

1179
604
1648
1648
2733
2246
(White population did not meet the 400-person threshold to be counted by census.)
1086
577
1602
1603
2660
2182

10058
9710

93

27

46

45

73

64

348

$7,102

$7,292

$8,052

$9,384

$9,614

$8,904

27.6

46.6

28.3

42.4

37.7

34.6

28

48.6

37.5

37.7

39

30.5

$8,391
(avg. of means)
36.2
(avg. of means)
36.88
(avg. of means)

Housing
Total Stock
Owner Occupied
Black
White

373
76
64
12

228
39
37
2

605
104
99
5

552
147
134
13

886
266
251
15

832
238
222
16

3476
870
807
63

Rental
Black
White

242
230
12

158
149
9

414
401
13

335
325
10

513
508
5

512
502
10

2174
2115
59

44
$11,100

29
$15,000

84
$14,400

65
$17,400

102
$17,700

77
$16,100

401
$15,283
(avg. of means)

Median Income $
% High School Graduates
% Below Poverty Line

Vacant Lots
Median Home Value $

City of
Milwaukee

$16,028
63.6
11.2

$45,500
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Table A-6: 1990 Census Tract Data for Area that Becomes Lindsay Heights
Census Tracts
Population Total
White
Black
Foreign Born
Other
Non-Black
Median Income $
% High School
Graduates
% Below Poverty Line
Housing
Total Stock
Owner Occupied
Black
White
Rental
Black
White
Vacant Lots
Median Home Value $

27/118

28/117

37/102

38/101

50/86

LH
Consolidated

51/85

1039
504
1355
1440
2395
1906
(White population did not meet the 400-person threshold to be counted by census.)
993
499
1330
1411
2342
1873

City of Milwaukee

8639
8448

46

5

25

29

53

33

191

$13,417

$9,392

$9,709

$12,306

$12,041

$9,607

$11,079
(avg. of means)

$32,359

43

46.8

42

35

38.6

50.7

79.7

54.2

57.9

59.9

61.1

48

49.2

42.68
(avg. of means)
55.05
(avg. of means)

270
83

174
26

420
90

397
107

652
181

609
185

2522
672

187

148

330

290

471

424

1850

$23,800

$17,900

$21,100

$25,000

$23,300

N/A
$23,700

$22,467
(avg. of means)

11.5

$76,600
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Table A-7: 2000 Census Tract Data for Area that Becomes Lindsay Heights
Census Tracts

27/118

28/117

37/102

38/101

50/86

LH
Consolidated

51/85

City of
Milwaukee

Population Total
White
Black
Foreign Born
Other
Non-Black

639
24
552

436
7
396

880
15
842

1158
36
1072

1651
20
1608

1590
61
1474

6354
163
5944

46

25

1

14

2

18

106

Median Income $

$8,667

$1,071

$6,251

$2,478

$4,073

$7,361

$4,984
(avg. of means)

$16,028

% High School
Graduates

18.9

30.7

25.7

39.3

29.9

37.6

63.6

% Below Poverty Line

17.2

40.7

46.7

36.8

46.4

46.4

30.35
(avg. of means)
39.03
(avg. of means)

242
91

151
24

406
72

327
90

590
161

586
170

Housing
Total Stock
Owner Occupied
Black
White
Rental
Black
White
Vacant Lots
Median Home Value $

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

11.2

2302
608
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

242
N/A
N/A

158
N/A
N/A

414
N/A
N/A

335
N/A
N/A

513
N/A
N/A

512
N/A
N/A

2174
N/A
N/A

39
$48,200

7
$65,000

78
$19,400

54
$53,800

82
$31,000

71
$23,600

331
$40,167
(avg. of means)

$45,500
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APPENDIX B
1995 parcels
Variables Entered/Removed
Model

d

1

Variables

Variables

Entered

Removed

Value_SQFT,

i

bldgarea_1,

m

area

b

Method
. Enter

a

e

n

s

i

o

n

0

a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: catotal_1

Model Summary
Model
R
d

1

.916

R Square
a

.839

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate
.839

2.04814065E4

i

m

e

n

s

i

o

n

0

a. Predictors: (Constant), Value_SQFT, bldgarea_1, area
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b

ANOVA
Model
1

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Regression

3.945E12

3

1.315E12

Residual

7.576E11

1806

4.195E8

Total

4.702E12

1809

F

Sig.

3134.645

.000

a

a. Predictors: (Constant), Value_SQFT, bldgarea_1, area
b. Dependent Variable: catotal_1

Coefficients
Model
Unstandardized Coefficients
B
1 (Constant)

Std. Error

a

Standardized

Collinearity

Coefficients

Statistics

Beta

t

Sig.

Tolerance

-21.909

.000

VIF

-21829.077

996.353

area

4.719

.089

.764

53.120

.000

.431 2.321

bldgarea_1

2.675

.237

.158

11.287

.000

.454 2.200

1176.234

98.069

.120

11.994

.000

.890 1.124

Value_SQFT

a. Dependent Variable: catotal_1

Collinearity Diagnostics
Model

Dimension

d

1

i

m

e

Index

(Constant)

area

bldgarea_1

Value_SQFT

1

2.925

1.000

.02

.03

.02

.02

2

.730

2.001

.07

.11

.10

.10

3

.233

3.540

.17

.47

.40

.17

4

.112

5.116

.74

.40

.48

.71

n

dimension1

s

i

o

n

0

a.

Variance Proportions

Condition
Eigenvalue

a

Dependent Variable: catotal_1
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2000 Parcels
Variables Entered/Removed
Model

d

1

Variables

Variables

Entered

Removed

Value_SQFT,

Method
. Enter

area, bldgarea

i

b

a

m

e

n

s

i

o

n

0

a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: catotal

Model Summary
Model
R
d

1

.874

R Square
a

.763

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate
.763

i

m

e

n

s

i

o

n

0

a. Predictors: (Constant), Value_SQFT, area, bldgarea

1.61987838E4
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b

ANOVA
Model

Sum of Squares

1

df

Mean Square

Regression

1.384E12

3

4.612E11

Residual

4.293E11

1636

2.624E8

Total

1.813E12

1639

F

Sig.

1757.617

.000

a

a. Predictors: (Constant), Value_SQFT, area, bldgarea
b. Dependent Variable: catotal

Coefficients
Model

Unstandardized

Standardized

Collinearity

Coefficients

Coefficients

Statistics

B
1

(Constant)

Std. Error

-21697.632

855.736

area

3.246

.090

bldgarea

4.066
1609.522

Value_SQFT

a

Beta

t

Sig.

Tolerance

VIF

-25.356

.000

.569

36.058

.000

.581

1.722

.253

.255

16.097

.000

.578

1.729

49.504

.410

32.513

.000

.910

1.099

a. Dependent Variable: catotal

Model

Dimension
Eigenvalue

d

1

i

m

e

a

Condition

Variance Proportions

Index

(Constant)

area

bldgarea

Value_SQFT

1

3.078

1.000

.02

.03

.02

.02

2

.564

2.337

.04

.11

.13

.24

3

.239

3.589

.20

.61

.26

.12

4

.120

5.072

.74

.26

.58

.62

n

dimension1

s

i

o

n

0

a.

Collinearity Diagnostics

Dependent Variable: catotal
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2005 parcels
Variables Entered/Removed
Model

d

1

Variables

Variables

Entered

Removed

ave_sqft, area,
bldgarea

i

b

Method
. Enter

a

m

e

n

s

i

o

n

0

a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: catotal

Model Summary
Model
R
d

1

.795

R Square
a

.631

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate
.631

i

m

e

n

s

i

o

n

0

a. Predictors: (Constant), ave_sqft, area, bldgarea

29692.012
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b

ANOVA
Model

Sum of Squares

1

df

Mean Square

F

Regression

2.670E12

3

8.901E11

Residual

1.559E12

1768

8.816E8

Total

4.229E12

1771

Sig.

1009.664

.000

a

a. Predictors: (Constant), ave_sqft, area, bldgarea
b. Dependent Variable: catotal

Coefficients
Model

Unstandardized

Standardized

Collinearity

Coefficients

Coefficients

Statistics

B
1

(Constant)

a

Std. Error

Beta

t

-9583.553 1274.162

area

Sig.

-7.521

.000

Tolerance

VIF

.892

.138

.149

6.480

.000

.395

2.529

bldgarea

4.068

.321

.293 12.667

.000

.390

2.564

ave_sqft

1741.591

36.584

.707 47.605

.000

.946

1.057

a. Dependent Variable: catotal

Collinearity Diagnostics
Model

d

a

Dimension

1

i

m

e

Variance Proportions
Eigenvalue

Condition Index

(Constant)

1

2.789

1.000

.03

.03

.02

.03

2

.860

1.801

.06

.06

.09

.16

3

.212

3.625

.67

.24

.08

.48

4

.139

4.474

.25

.67

.81

.33

n

d i mensi on1

s

i

o

n

0

a. Dependent Variable: catotal

area

bldgarea

ave_sqft

